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

WHERE IS THE CATHOLIC VOTE?

DAVID C. LEEGE

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To the Editors

Elusive common ground

Cardinal Bernardin's challenge to find some Catholic common ground [editorial, September 13] is a great idea. I am not as hopeful about its outcome as I might have been several years ago.

I began my work on conservative Catholics in 1991, hoping that understanding would lead directly to constructive dialogue. A year-long research trip took me to newly established Catholic colleges; home-schooling venues and conventions; annual gatherings of conservative nuns (opposed to the Leadership Conference of Religious Women); groups of lay people more drawn to "the chaplet of divine mercy" (a devotion inspired by private revelations to Sister Faustina in the 1930s) than to the vernacular Mass. I talked to serious conservative Catholics ranging in age from sixteen to eighty-four, and found them eager to talk to me, partly because no one else had asked them how they felt about contemporary Catholicism.

Galvanized by that year, I worked with R. Scott Appleby (Notre Dame) to come up with a common-ground project of our own. We designed and edited what eventually became *Being Right: Conservative Catholics in America* (Indiana University Press, 1995). We were sufficiently encouraged during this work to expand our project to a mapping exercise designed to look closely at American Catholicism from within its right, left, and center territories. Cardinal Bernardin's statement, therefore, is fully in line with something we have been working on the past few years.

Can we actually find common ground? Scott and I are not always in agreement on this point, and I want to make clear that my dampened enthusiasm is completely my own. My experience leads me to believe that finding common ground is probably not possible for those living in different mental universes. Yes, a feminist like me can have a cordial conversation with an antifeminist like Helen Hull Hitchcock, but only because we know how to behave in public. We can go to Mass together, for example, but the language of worship would divide us, enraging one or the other depending on whether it was inclusive or traditional.

Traditionalists and progressives have widely disparate ideas about the nature of the church, the authority of the pope, the theology of the Mass, and the truth behind *Humanae vitae*, clerical celibacy, an all-male priesthood, and the future of religious life. However faithful we are to Catholicism, we pray and think differently. I would love to think we could find some common ground and am willing to continue working in that direction. I simply want to say that it is going to take more work than anyone can imagine who has not already tried it.

MARY JO WEAVER
Bloomington, Ind.

The writer is professor of religious studies, Indiana University.



"I'm not a boaster, but turning the other cheek has become a thing of fine art with me."

I want to vote, but...

Never have I read an article, in *Commonweal* or any other publication, that put into words so exactly what I've been mulling over. Sidney Callahan ["Dear Mr. Clinton," August 16] describes me when she describes herself. Like her, I find that "my multiple disillusionments with Bill Clinton have boiled over." Again, it was his veto of the partial-birth abortion ban that did it for me as it did for her.

However, I cannot vote for Dole. The Republican views on issues such as social justice, the environment, and the economy contravene everything I believe in. Should they win, I can see only disaster for our country.

In the same issue, Victor Ferkiss solves the problem for himself with a vote for Ralph Nader. Apart from that option (not available in every polling place), what is someone for whom voting is an important function of citizenship to do?

KATHLEEN JANSON
Southbury, Conn.

How not to waste a vote

How many other "unreconstructed Humphrey-McGovern, 'pinko,' 'socialist,' 'big government,' 'bleeding heart,' 'peacenik' Democrats" have snapped [Sidney Callahan, August 16] or are on "the verge of remission" from a lifetime of voting Democratic [Victor Ferkiss, same issue]? In my case, what did it was the president's action on welfare reform (along with the votes of both Wisconsin senators). Unlike Ms. Callahan, I will not vote for Bob Dole. Like Mr. Ferkiss, I will consider a vote for Ralph Nader, or another independent candidate (not Ross Perot). And I will support candidates for other offices either directly

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COMMONWEAL

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or via such groups as the League of Conservation Voters. I, too, do not wish to waste my vote, or time, or money. (But I will send money for the Commonweal Associates.)

THOMAS J. McGOVERN
Milwaukee, Wis.

Sidney's switch

Just finished Sidney Callahan's bailout from the Democratic party over the matter of partial-birth abortion and her tacit abandonment of all the critical issues Democrats have espoused for the past half-century ["Dear Mr. Clinton," August 16]. As one who has found Ms. Callahan's (and her husband Daniel's) views on matters from birth (control) to death (euthanasia) stimulating and provocative, I find her elephantine lurch to the right sad and irresolute. She sounds suddenly like a one-issue right-to-lifer. That's not the Sidney Callahan we've grown to love and admire for her wrestling with matters of conscience and policy.

Perhaps in her haste to run with the pachyderms she should have deferred penning her *apologia* until after the Republican convention. While I too consider President Clinton's posture on partial-birth abortions very equivocal, it will hardly dispose me to leap into the Dole camp. Talk about compromising one's principles! Does Callahan really buy into Dole's version of supply-side economics? And what about his running mate's flip-flop on immigration and affirmative action?

Then, how about the column's mean digs about Bill and Hillary's White-House-Lite moral scruples, and its cheap shot at *It Takes a Village*? Ms. Callahan concludes her reverie by asking how this "end-of-the millennium melodrama" will play itself out, as "comedy, tragedy, or farce." Based on her switcheroo, I vote for farce.

WILLIAM HONNEN
Saint Augustine, Fla.

The author replies:

My thanks to all my friends, family, and newly acquired enemies who have offered me evangelical correction on my decision to vote for Dole and advised me to retract forthwith. Yes, friends, as I tried to make clear, I am casting my vote mainly to protest Clinton's veto of the partial-birth abortion bill and secondarily in distrust of Clinton's moral character. I can't believe that this neoconservative president is going to do any better than the Republicans on welfare, capital punishment, gay rights, and military interventions.

By the way, I wrote my column *before* the signing of the shameful welfare bill, before Dick Morris, and before missiles were deployed and troops mobilized in the Gulf. Still, the core of the disagreement we wrestle with is whether it is ever right to cast a vote on a single issue with more symbolic than practical import. I am making the judgment that occasionally it is correct to let a single issue determine your vote—when it seems necessary to protest a symbolic action that crosses a morally bright line.

So maybe I'm wrong. I'm willing to be convinced by those who truly believe the unborn are human beings who need protection. SIDNEY CALLAHAN

Words to think by

Richard Liddy's "Can Lonergan Replace Aquinas?" [June 14] has just hit my desk. Magnificent! A shot in the arm that reminds me of one administered by the Duke of Edinburgh twenty years ago in Adelaide, South Australia. Acknowledging bestowal of an honorary degree awarded by the University of Adelaide, he delivered its Centenary Oration on the contribution of higher education to Western culture. I have not seen a better brief statement of the traditional function of the university and of the direction that Australian universities should be taking: Their first emphasis, he proposed, should be given to the development of a precise and sophisticated language in which we can formulate and discuss abstruse matters of profound importance—theology and philosophy among them. Or, as I should put it most generally, the chief function of school and university is that of enabling students to master their own language. JOHN W. DOYLE, S.J.
Kew, Victoria, Australia

The writer is dean of studies at John Fisher College, University of Tasmania.

Abortion as euthanasia

With respect to the debate over the president's veto of the partial-birth abortion ban, the real moral issue centers on elective late-term abortion, and here we encounter a factor that is not much talked about but which I suspect is a major factor in the decision of attending doctors to recommend the hideous procedure. If we assume that a hydrocephalic fetus carried to term is likely to emerge a hydrocephalic child lacking normal intellectual capacity, the recommendation and decision are elevated to a form of preemptive euthanasia and become a broader challenge to morality than the question of abortion alone.

The issue has special relevance for me because of my wartime experience as a conscientious objector assigned to service at an institution for what were then classified as "mental defectives." Rosewood's "children" included many hydrocephalics, ranging over all three of the crude classifications then popular: "idiot" (no intellectual capacity); "imbecile" (possessing at least a semblance of intelligence); and "moron" (short of normal but able to do much of the work that kept the institution going). The impression one had of the hydrocephalics, however, was that they were content and even happy. This was true of even the unfortunates whose entire lives would be spent rocking back and forth in the lowest-level cottage.

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Commonweal, [ISSN 0010-3330] A Review of Public Affairs, Religion, Literature, and the Arts, is published biweekly except Christmas/New Year's; and monthly July and August, by Commonweal Foundation, 15 Dutch St., New York, NY, 10038. Telephone: (212) 732-0800. Display advertising correspondence should be sent to Ruth E. Taylor, 11 Graffam Rd., So. Portland, ME 04106 (207) 799-4387, classified advertising correspondence to 15 Dutch St. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Commonweal, 15 Dutch St. New York, NY 10038.

Commonweal is indexed in Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature, Catholic Periodical Index, Index of American Periodical Verse, Book Review Digest, and Book Review Index. Microfilm from Vol. 1, 1924, to current issues available through University Microfilm, 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106 and on Microfiche from Bell & Howell, Wooster, OH 44691. *Commonweal* articles also are available at many libraries and research facilities on CD-ROM and in electronic data bases. Serials Data program No.: ISSN 0010-3330. Periodicals postage paid at New York, N.Y., and at additional offices. Copyright © 1996 Commonweal Foundation. Single Copy, $2.25. Yearly subscriptions, U.S., $44; Canada, $47; foreign, $50. Special two-year rate: U.S. $75; Canada, $81; foreign, $87. Annual rates for air-mail delivery outside U.S.: Western Hemisphere, $84; Europe, $89; other parts of the world, $99. All Canadian and foreign subscriptions must be paid in U.S. dollars by International Money Order or by check on a U.S. bank.

Illustrations: Cover, Antonucci; p. 2, Ross, Rothco; p. 3, Leed, Rothco; pp. 3, 20, photo credit: David Appleby, courtesy Miramax Films; pp. 6, 31, Schwadron, Rothco; p. 7, Donegan, Rothco; pp. 8, 9, 23, Ray, Rothco; p. 11, Langdon, Rothco; p. 21, Baloo, Rothco; p. 26, Salo, Rothco; p. 27, Valerry; columnist portraits, Elaine Mills.

'Catholic' voters?

The good news is that younger Catholic voters may decide this year's presidential election. The bad news is that many of those young Catholic voters aren't very Catholic—at least not if being Catholic means going regularly to Mass and having some modest acquaintance with the church's social and moral teaching.

As David C. Leege explains (*see* page 11) with the help of some fascinating historical and demographic examples, the "Catholic vote" is likely to figure prominently in this November's election. Several factors account for this, the most important being that young Catholics form pluralities in the large Midwestern and Midatlantic states that could tip the balance in the electoral college in a close presidential race. These young Catholics came of political age under the charismatic Ronald Reagan and are also drawn to the Republican party on economic issues, but surprisingly they hold much more "permissive" social and moral views than most Republicans, especially Christian Coalition members. On abortion, for example, these young Catholics are more prochoice than evangelicals and tend to swing toward Democratic candidates if Republican rhetoric becomes too strident about the so-called "profamily agenda." Moreover, these younger, Republican-leaning Catholics are irregular churchgoers who, unlike their evangelical contemporaries, are not likely to be influenced politically by church leadership.

This political dynamic was readily evident in Bob Dole's selection of Staten Island's Congresswoman Susan Molinari (R-N.Y.) as keynote speaker at the Republican convention. Molinari is a Catholic ethnic of the baby-boomer generation who is (a) prochoice, (b) divorced, and (c) a mother with a professional career. Following the results of polls and focus groups, both parties are trying to appeal to voters with similar profiles. The evident failure of church teaching on abortion to find a receptive hearing among these young people seems yet another sad reminder of how little credibility the church has with them and with women in general.

These younger Catholics are not nearly as tightly "woven" into the church as their parents or grandparents were, Leege explains. There are many reasons for the loosening of those ties, not all of them negative. What Leege calls the baby-boom and post-baby boom generation of Catholics are better educated, more prosperous, more mobile, and more politically independent than their elders. But they also attend Mass less frequently and are less knowledgeable about the church's social teaching. On abortion and a range of personal moral issues, the views of these young Catholics more often reflect the premium most Americans place on individual liberty and choice than the church's belief in objective moral norms and the sanctity of all human life.

In and of itself, such a disparity between pulpit and pew is not fatal. Moral law cannot simply be translated into public policy. What is worrisome, however, is how very tenuous the connection between young Catholics and the church appears to be. Being Catholic does not mean that one must agree with the pope or the bishops about public policy on welfare, euthanasia, immigration, and abortion. But it should require a serious engagement with what the church teaches about the relationship between our moral obligations and our political responsibilities.

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

"Father, I'm a fallen-away Democrat."

The absence of such a dialogue is as much a loss for American society as it is for the church. The United States faces challenges in both the economic and moral realms, challenges that threaten the well-being of working families and the elderly, and the fundamental human dignity of the unborn, the poor, and the dying. An exaggerated sense of individualism harnessed to a utilitarian ethos too often dominates public and political debate about everything from economic efficiency and the role of government to abortion and euthanasia. As a result, we see our common life diminished, vital institutions of civil society undermined, and the weak increasingly left undefended and exploited.

The political principles developed within Catholicism, especially during and since the Vatican II, can provide an antidote. Church social teaching reminds us of the social nature of the individual and of the state's responsibility for the common good. Catholic political and moral thought can help steer a middle way between the economic libertarianism of the right and the moral agnosticism of much contemporary culture and many on the left. The Catholic tradition offers a reasoned approach to moral decision-making that provides an essential safeguard of the right to life, and may even help turn our politics away from focus groups and "spin doctors" and back toward meaningful deliberation.

But if Catholic principles are to make a contribution to the American political debate, they first have to be known and acted upon by Catholics themselves. On that score, there is lots of work to be done.

BOSNIA

The Bosnian national elections of September 14 did not raise great expectations. And rightly so. They confirm the power of the most nationalistic elements among Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians, which is to say among those least inclined to work at fostering any multi-ethnic Bosnian state. Local elections were postponed pending a normalization of the voting process, that is, of finding a means to allow refugees to return to their "home" towns, villages, and cities to cast their ballots for local officials. But still the "national" election took place. However modest an event, this is better than the slaughter of a year ago.

D.W. Winnicott, the English child psychiatrist, coined the phrase "good-enough mothering" to reassure ordinary women that they were capable mothers even when their performance did not achieve the heights set by child-rearing "experts." "Good-enough peacemaking" is what we have in Bosnia. It is not up to the standards peacemaking experts set forth, even in the limited Dayton Accords. Yet there is at least a cessation of rape, pillage, and ethnic cleansing, and here and there forms of civil society are returning. Yes, NATO troops are there, and there they should remain until enough ordinary people have picked up their lives, and life itself has become more normal, and more peaceful. A modest expectation, but good enough.

OF SEVERAL MINDS

DAVID R. CARLIN, JR.

RED BOB

Dole as fellow traveler

The trouble with Bob Dole is that he's too much of a Marxist. I don't mean that his heart bleeds for the condition of the toiling masses, whether foreign or domestic. It is doubtful he had heard of the toiling masses until Pat Buchanan had the bad form to mention them earlier this year. Nor do I mean that Dole wants to expropriate the expropriators. Just the opposite, he wants to help the rich get richer.

(Of course to camouflage his proposed windfall for the rich, he's had to sweeten the pot with an income-tax cut for average Americans. And to appease the family-values crowd, he's had to throw in a five-hundred-dollar-per-child tax credit. But the capitalists won't object to those sops as long as they themselves are taken care of royally.)

I certainly don't mean to say that Dole favors the dictatorship of the proletariat or the classless society. And despite endless GOP talk about "smaller government," he doesn't favor the withering away of the state either.

All the same, Dole (or whoever designs his campaign strategy) is a kind of Marxist since he accepts the fundamental axiom of Marxism, which is this: The only factor that really counts in society is the economic factor. It is the sys-

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tem of wealth production that makes the world go round. All other factors—politics, religion, philosophy, law, science, scholarship, literature, art, education, entertainment, journalism, etc.—are secondary, if that. The economy is the cause, they the effects.

Consistent with his Marxist philosophy, Dole has reduced his essential campaign message to two economic proposals: tax cuts plus a balanced budget. The idea is that a combination of the two will prove a sovereign remedy for all that ails us. It is precisely the platform Lenin would have run on had he been a Republican.

Are you worried about crime? Violence? Illegitimacy? Divorce? Poor schools? Abortion? Sexually transmitted diseases? Corrupt business practices? Rampant and ruthless greed? Or a hundred other moral and cultural ills? Well, worry no longer. Tax cuts plus a balanced budget will produce prosperity, and prosperity will make all these problems go away.

Oh, from time to time Dole mentions these things in passing. In late August, for instance, when drug use among the young happened to be front-page news for a few days, he promised a renewed war on drugs. But these are sidebar issues. His campaign has made it clear that the real issues are tax cuts and a balanced budget.

Ironically, in his acceptance speech at the GOP convention he criticized the unofficial Clinton slogan of four years ago, "It's the economy, stupid." Yet he's running on precisely the same slogan.

Most Dole critics have focused their attention on the apparent contradiction between the two economic proposals. "How can we have a balanced budget," they ask, "if we also have a drastic tax cut?" But they have paid scant attention to the far more fundamental flaw in the Dole agenda, namely that the Marxist axiom is nonsensical. You can't solve a nation's problems by addressing its economic problems alone. For that matter, you can't even solve its economic problems by addressing economic problems alone.

Marxism was refuted in practice by the great Communist experiment of the twentieth century. But well before the events of 1917 it was refuted in theory by Max Weber, who argued that society cannot be explained in terms of the economic factor alone. Rather it is explainable in terms of a combination of economic and cultural factors—"culture" here being close to a synonym for "religion." Hence Weber's famous thesis, that the nineteenth-century industrial revolution was the offspring of the seventeenth-century Puritan mentality.



"Well, at least I got one thing right. Money was everything."

I have argued in the past that the public senses something has gone profoundly wrong with American culture in the last thirty years (*see*, "It's the Culture, Stupid!" *Commonweal*, September 23, 1994). Despite the fact that those who sense this most acutely—neoconservatives at the intellectual level, the Religious Right at the mass level—have become major players in the Republican party, the Dole campaign, with its "the economy is the only thing that counts" theme, has elected to sidestep this gigantic issue, or at least to downplay it.

In addition to their Wall Street Marxism, the Dole advisers don't want their man to address the cultural issue because they're afraid it will make the Republicans look "divisive," a synonym for "Buchananesque." God forbid that anyone should be divisive.

For a generation people with traditional religious beliefs and values, especially old-fashioned Protestants, have been treated with contempt by America's secularist and quasi-secularist elites. They have been the butts of endless jokes and sneers; they have routinely been targets of moralistic indignation; they have been stereotyped as stupid, bigoted, mean-spirited, and sexually repressed. Somehow this high-status contempt has never counted as divisive. Yet when the low-status objects of contempt fight back, this counts as divisive. Such is the alchemy of politics.

So does this mean that those who are unhappy with the moral tone of U.S. society will have no candidate to vote for? Not at all. They can vote for the incumbent president. Bill Clinton, whether he's a Weberian or because his pollsters run better focus groups, understands what Bob Dole and his neo-Marxist advisers don't seem to get, that the culture counts as well as the economy.

That's why Clinton has reinvented himself as a cultural conservative, a family-values candidate. He's the champion of teen curfews, school uniforms, decency on TV, getting tough on welfare recipients. He's the foe of tobacco, assault weapons, crime, and gay marriage.

Some will object, "Yes, but Clinton's not sincere, he's a mere opportunist. Look, for instance, at his veto of the partial-birth abortion bill. How can we trust the moral bona fides of someone who defends a procedure tantamount to infanticide?"

A point well taken. But it's a point that will make no difference if Bob Dole runs a neo-Marxist campaign, in the meantime leaving Clinton free to exploit the cultural issues. □

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SIDNEY CALLAHAN

LET'S TALK

The search for common ground

Welcome, welcome, all hail to the new Catholic Common Ground Project. This initiative, introduced in the statement "Called to Be Catholic: Church in a Time of Peril," aims to further civil and charitable dialogue within our beloved but fractious American church (*see*, editorial, *Commonweal*, September 13). The larger goal is nothing less than a revitalized, renewed church ready to move into the next millennium.

Clearly, to start such a process of internal peacemaking is a bold and brave action. It takes courage to speak out and honestly confront the family's problems—while still living at home. Thank God the great and good Cardinal Joseph Bernardin is heading this project; he has proven himself a trustworthy bridge over troubled waters. He is also a holy man who has borne many trials and has just announced that he has only a year to live. This project will be one of his last gifts to the church.

But if it is true that no good deed goes unpunished (at least in this life), Cardinal Bernardin will experience more pain and aggravation for his efforts to further dialogue and foster church unity. Already, the Catholic Common Ground Project has been attacked—appropriately enough from both ends of the polarized spectrum of American church opinion. Certain left-of-liberal leaders of church reform movements cry foul because they have not (yet?) been invited to participate. Admittedly most of the twenty-four individuals announced as members of the advisory committee for the Catholic Common Ground Project—one cardinal, seven bishops, and sixteen priests, nuns, and laypersons—are irreproachable mainstream Catholics. They inhabit what I like to call "the Catholic center," or "the radical middle."

The outstanding leadership qualities of Cardinal Bernardin and his committee members make it all the more surprising and troubling that sharp critiques come from some of Bernardin's more conservative fellow prelates who fault this call for a common ground. They see the crisis in the church as requiring not dialogue but "a clarion call to conversion." Of course all Christians are always in need of conversion, but the suspicion lingers that "conversion" in this usage appears to be equated with double-quick submissions to the magisterium. Perhaps these critics of dialogue would like to see more of those "retract and submit" missives come from over the water.

At times, if rumor can be believed, such directions and loyalty oaths from Rome arrive by fax! Technological progress like this is almost enough to make one long for a primitive past when subsidiarity was ensured by the fact that it could take a papal legate months to toil over the Alps.

But those were also the bad old days when many Christian thinkers could champion the divine right of kings, a doctrine which must have helped skew the theory and function of the magisterium in the church. Slowly, however, Christian thinking on the liberty of conscience, human rights, subsidiarity, and social justice evolved and was proclaimed by popes and councils. And just as surely, demands increase for more collegial governance *within* the church.

"We come in peace."

Intrachurch conflicts of conscience over difficult issues can no longer be quelled by some church authority unilaterally issuing a directive. It no longer works to demand that those who have questions must prove their commitment to Christ by silent submission. If there ever existed a time when a command structure could order "one, two, button your shoe, three, four, shut the door"—problem solved, case dismissed—those days are long gone.

A theology in which faithfulness to God in Christ is identified with unquestioning obedience no longer convinces the majority of loyal and devout Catholics. Indeed, theological distortions, misunderstandings, and abuses of authority are seen by many as the major problems afflicting the current church. An impasse has been reached when one version of Christian fidelity mandates silent, prompt submission to any decrees from a legitimate authority, while another model of faithfulness to the church demands dialogue, respect for conscientious dissent, consultation, and collegiality.

And it is important to recognize that in these current debates the various participants who disagree may be prayerful individuals trying their best to be faithful to Christ. What is at stake here is not individual morality and good will, however, but what institutional structures and operational procedures are appropriate in our post-Vatican II church. Consequently we cannot avoid engaging in fundamental dialogues about the nature of the church and the exercise of Christian authority.

In my opinion, intrachurch debates surrounding sexuality, reproduction, women in the church, Catholic institutional identity, religious education, liturgical practice, and how to pass on the faith to the next generation can only be resolved if we can settle our deeper differences over how loyal Catholics should proceed when in good conscience they disagree.

This problem is by no means new!

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The New Testament reveals that from the very beginning there have been conflicts, dissent, disagreement, and differences of opinion over what the Holy Spirit asks of the church. How much unity and conformity must exist along with how much freedom, liberty, and diversity? Yes, surely we must have boundaries, limits, and a common authority in order to exist as a distinct community. The "Called to Be Catholic" statement certainly affirms the necessity of coherent definitions and boundaries. But to recognize the need for boundaries does not solve the problem of how we determine where such lines should be drawn.

While trying to wend my way through these dilemmas, I have been inspired by Saint Paul's words to the contentious church in Corinth. "Indeed," he says, "there have to be factions among you, for only so will it become clear who among you are genuine" (1 Cor. 11:19). Only debate, disagreement, and a certain amount of divisiveness can clarify and test what will build up the church. Differences and dialogue can be constructive. But then Paul goes on to set forth the basic Christian groundrule for all interactions among individual members of the body—that is, love and charity. "Love is patient, love is kind; love is not envious or boastful or arrogant or rude. It does not insist on its own way; it is not irritable or resentful; it does not rejoice in wrongdoing, but rejoices in the truth. It bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things. Love never ends" (1 Cor. 13:4–7).

The Catholic Common Ground Project proposes to put this counsel into practice with civil, charitable, and honest dialogue in its future conferences, consultations, and deliberations. It invites us to enter into another round of the eternal conversation. On to the next millennium. □

George W. Grayson

MEXICO'S CRIME WAVE

The cops are part of the problem

Following the devastating earthquakes that struck Mexico City in September 1985, President Miguel de la Madrid refused to activate the army's emergency relief plan. Apparently, he feared that the military's stature and influence would soar as policymakers from his ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) stood paralyzed by the disaster. Eleven years later, this June, chief executive Ernesto Zedillo replaced the capital's top seventeen public-safety officials with army generals and colonels. He hopes they can reverse the city's mounting crime rate and extirpate police corruption before Mexico City elects its first mayor next summer. But Zedillo's action could pave the way for Mexico's civilian-controlled armed forces, which now boast a much brighter image than the police, to repeat the dismal pattern of what has already happened in strife-torn Colombia.

Once renowned for its tranquillity, Mexico City has witnessed an alarming upswing in violent crime, apace with growing unemployment and misery, especially since the 50-percent devaluation of the peso following 1994's "Christmas crisis." The number of serious crimes reported in a single day has shot up from 290 in 1982 to 700 in 1995; during the first six months of 1996, the crime rate surged a further 40 percent. Every opinion poll highlights "public safety" as the paramount concern of the capital city's 18 million residents, an astounding two-fifths of whom claim that they or a close family member was victimized in 1995, according to the newspaper *Reforma*. This figure seems inflated, but in terms of political impact, perception often outweighs reality.

The police, whose monthly salaries hover around $200, exacerbate the problem. Long infamous for extracting bribes to drop trumped-up charges, law-enforcement officers have increasingly become involved in car thefts, burglaries, assaults, murders, narcotics-trafficking, and even protecting drug lords. The *Reforma* survey revealed that most Mexico City residents have "little" (34 percent) or "no" (52 percent) confidence in their municipal police.

The public's animus toward the blue- and brown-shirted officers—scorned as "thieves," "rats," and "leeches"—has only intensified since the incarceration of 229 law-enforcement agents during the first three months of 1994, the last period for which data are available. Zedillo's move to replace the city's civilian public safety head with army General Enrique Salgado Cordero sprang from three factors: (1) escalating fear voiced by the overwhelming majority of Mexico City dwellers; (2) police reluctance to enter Tepito, Buenos Aires, and other gang-infested neighborhoods at night; and (3) the PRI's nightmare that it well might lose next year's race for mayor—a potent stepping stone to the presidency in the year 2000—if the party fails to launch a successful, high-profile anticrime crusade.

Entrusting generals to command Mexico City's police is not a novel idea. Since 1897, thirty of the capital's sixty-nine



"You call this getting the criminals off the street?!"

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police chiefs have been army officers, even though recent presidents have preferred civilians. Reportedly, military men discharge law-enforcement roles in twenty-two of the country's thirty-one states. In Mexico as in most Latin American countries, however, generals-turned-gendarmes have done little to diminish either the crime rate or the culture of pervasive corruption that wracks the law-enforcement community. For several reasons, however, the PRI government believes that the fifty-eight-year-old Salgado will succeed where his predecessors failed.

First, the handsome, square-jawed general has distinguished himself as the zone commander in impoverished, violence-ridden Guerrero state. Second, rather than assuming command alone, Salgado has brought along a team of tenacious, seasoned officers to take charge of the city's eleven separate law-enforcement units. Finally, Zedillo and the PRI have doubled the city's budget to fight crime, fully aware that their political stock—the president's approval rating quivers around 46 percent—will plummet if insecurity deepens. Meanwhile, the center-right National Action Party (PAN) is gaining momentum, in part because of its law-and-order, professionalize-the-cops appeals. For example, since taking office twenty-two months ago, PAN Attorney General Antonio Lozano Gracia has dismissed more than 700 of the execrably venal 4,400-member Federal Judicial Police, Mexico's version of the FBI.

Although Salgado and company may marginally improve public safety, the risks of assigning police functions to senior officers in the 130,000-member army greatly eclipse the potential benefits. For starters, the army already has enough on its hands bird-dogging guerrilla groups such as the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR) which launched armed assaults in six different states last month. While more a thorn in Zedillo's side than a dagger in his heart, the EPR attacks could unnerve domestic and foreign investors just when the economy has begun to expand amid lower inflation rates and increased exports.

But danger lies in the armed forces' own affinity for repression over negotiation. During the last national security alert, only the good sense of President Carlos Salinas (1988-94)—reinforced by U.S. Ambassador James R. Jones's sage advice—kept the army from massacring peasants in dirt-poor Chiapas state, rather than allowing civilian authorities to marginalize the photogenic but innocuous Zapatista National Liberation Army. General Salgado, however, appears disinclined to bargain. As he recently told Mexico City authorities, "The police cannot function as they do now: we are going to be tough, inflexible within our ranks and toward outsiders."

No one sees Salgado or other prominent generals morphing into jackbooted Pinochets, but Mexico will likely suffer expanded social turmoil as economic growth remains anemic and tentative victories by PAN candidates spark trade-union activism.

As a democratic but weak president bestows greater power on the Mexican army, its shoot-first disposition could convert labor demonstrations, teacher protests, peasant marches, and other isolated incidents into regional brushfires. More alarming, though, is the army's inexorable advance into the drug quagmire. Under pressure from the Clinton administration, Zedillo has already enlarged the armed forces' role in the ever more visible war against drug kingpins. Originally limited to combating crops and shipments, the military now fights "violence generated by organized crime arising from the illegal traffic of drugs, precursor chemicals, and arms."

As the army assumes police duties in Mexico City and elsewhere, opportunities will multiply for contacts between its officials and narco-traffickers adept at suborning generals, not to mention modestly paid captains and lieutenants. Rather than risk greater corruption of the military, Zedillo would do better to seek advice from well-disciplined police forces abroad on how to reform Mexico's law-enforcement agencies. But as things now stand, says analyst María Teresa Jardí, "the reforms underway foretell a dark period which, once started, will not be easy to reverse—and we will all end up regretting it." □

George W. Grayson, *who teaches government at the College of William & Mary, has written* Mexico: From Corporatism to Pluralism?, *to be published by Harcourt Brace.*

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THE CATHOLIC VOTE IN '96

Can it be found in church?

David C. Leege

It is difficult to pick up a newsmagazine or newspaper without seeing some reference to the Republican courtship of the Catholic vote, or analyses of Catholics as swing voters, or even the claim that the 1996 election hinges on what Catholics decide. Much of this talk is inaccurate.

There is no monolithic "Catholic vote." The impact of Catholics as a *bloc* of the electorate is overrated. Nevertheless, younger Catholic voters could well determine the outcome of the 1996 presidential election. These apparently contrary claims are a function of two factors:

- Voting Catholics live mainly in the states with large electoral college votes where the election will be decided.
- Younger Catholics are less likely to pick up political cues at Mass, less likely to identify with the church's social teachings, and are more likely to be Republican. On the other hand, and more interesting still, these younger Catholics are more moderate on social issues than either their parents or the current Republican party. Finally, the most effective appeal to these swing voters will be more secular than religious.

Has there been a large movement of Catholics to the Republican cause? Pundits tend to focus on the Democratic party loyalties of Catholics in the early New Deal or look at the massive Catholic margin for Kennedy in 1960 and conclude from current figures that there has been a shift to the Republican party. Moreover, many journalists connect the church's teaching on abortion with the Republicans' anti-abortion plank and conclude that Catholics are closer to the Republican party's stances on family values and moral issues than they are to the Democrats'. These conclusions are historically myopic and sociologically mistaken.

Catholic political history: A capsule look

Except for two electoral periods when they rallied to one of their own in the face of religious persecution, Catholic voters have been a diverse lot. Much of this diversity is the result of ethnic migrations and settlement patterns. This story has been told by many historians and needs only a short summary here.

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The Irish were the American church's premier power brokers. They spoke English and understood Anglo-American political institutions. They became Democrats in response to religious persecution and the second-class citizenship perpetrated by the people who controlled the Whig, Know Nothing, Republican, and Progressive political parties. Their descendants have remained more Democratic than rising social status and economic success would have predicted.

When it came to politics, Italian women apparently listened to their Irish priests. But historically, Italian men tended to be anticlerical and became Republican. Italian men owned hauling trucks and vegetable farms. These respectively became the post-World War II trucking firms, suburban housing tracts, shopping malls, and financial institutions which shaped the powerful suburban Republican machines that now ring Northeastern cities.

German Catholics moved to the frontier very early, farming the heartland and settling the villages that became cities. Their politics were often the opposite of their German-Lutheran neighbors who were sometimes Republicans and sometimes Democrats. The anti-German hysteria of World War I, the anti-Catholicism of evangelical Protestants, and the Northern revival of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s—all

"This is an entirely new type of poll, sir. Alone in the privacy of the booth, who, strictly between you and me, will you really be voting for?"

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connected to the Democratic party—did much to consolidate German-American Catholics in the Republican fold.

Other Eastern and Southern European Catholic immigrants first voted Republican because their plant managers marched them to the polls with instructions to cast the Republican ballot and because the big-city ethnic machines early in this century were often Republican. The reaction to Al Smith's candidacy anchored them in the Democratic party, though some drifted to the Republicans when the cold war heated up. Eisenhower, Nixon, and Reagan proved more appealing than their Democratic opponents.

Except for Cubans, Latino-Catholic immigrants have been heavily Democratic, but they are only now becoming a force in the electorate. Since 1964, African-American Catholics have been solidly Democrat.

One event in modern Catholic political history has shaped everything since—the election of John F. Kennedy to the presidency in 1960. Kennedy's disavowal of any prior political loyalty to Rome before the Houston Ministerial Alliance and his subsequent behavior as president did much to allay the suspicions of Protestants and Jews as well as unchurched Americans. Vatican II's endorsement of religious liberty—advocated by many American clergy and politicians—was also a significant step.

Conservative and Republican Catholics followed Kennedy's lead. When the American bishops drafted pastoral letters on national defense and the economy, prominent Catholics from recent Republican administrations offered counter-statements. In time, Americans grew accustomed to Catholic political leaders, Democrats and Republicans alike, asserting their independence from clerical influence. Nowadays when the specter of theocracy is raised, it usually concerns evangelical preachers, not Catholic priests.

Kennedy's election is full of partisan irony. An analysis of American National Election Studies data-sets shows that 83 percent of those who called themselves Catholic on national surveys and who actually went to the polls voted for Kennedy. Further, Catholic identification with the Democratic party surged throughout the sixties. Nevertheless, Kennedy's election allowed Catholics in the Republican party to rise to prominence and made ordinary Catholics the target for Republican appeals.

Well before the end of the sixties, political analyst Kevin Phillips had outlined a New Majoritarian strategy aimed especially at Catholic men upset with the long reach of the federal government in implementing civil-rights and, later, feminist policies. When statewide ERA referenda failed in both New York and New Jersey in 1975, with the crucial negative votes cast in suburban Catholic communities, Republicans devised a strategy to attract those eventually called Reagan Democrats. Reagan himself was popular with Catholics. He could be forgiven that his drifter of a father had not brought him up in the church. His charm, his upbeat outlook, his loyalty to core values, and his capacity to answer questions with stories, not facts, identified him with a long line of Irish-Catholic politicians.

When Ronald Reagan won with substantial Catholic support in 1980, he filled his cabinet with an unprecedented number of Catholics. New opportunities opened for Catholic politicians; the stigma was gone. Under Reagan, the earlier political pluralism of Catholics, overturned by the Kennedy surge, returned. Yet the Reagan era also, and for the first time, stimulated a political voice for women separate from that of men. That voice found its home in the Democratic party.

When the Democrats selected Congresswoman Geraldine Ferarro as Walter Mondale's running mate in 1984, she faced some of the worst invective ever heard in modern American politics. Innuendoes first about links to lesbians and then to the mafia marked the campaign. But no Italian-American defense organization came to her defense, as they had for similarly situated men. Even "gentleman" George Bush said that he had "kicked a little butt" in the vice-presidential debate. The newly appointed archbishop of New York phrased a statement attacking Ferraro's stance on abortion in such a way that it seemed that a Catholic in good standing could not vote for her. Embarrassed by the transparent endorsement of the Republican ticket by the nation's most visible Catholic prelate, the president of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops quickly released a statement reiterating the obligation of bishops to offer general criteria for judging candidates and to refrain from endorsing candidates or parties.

The Ferraro candidacy confirmed three trends:

- A Catholic candidate will not always rally Catholics to the cause.
- Catholic women do not routinely view politics in the same way as Catholic men.
- Men can sometimes get ugly about successful women in politics.

After Ferraro, Catholic women began to take a long look at an emerging alliance between Catholic leaders and Republicans. They sensed they would come out on the short end of cultural politics, or "wedge issues," and fought back in 1988 and 1992.

Catholic political generations

There are pronounced generational differences in Catholic voting patterns. For Democratic candidates, the Catholic vote has turned into a contest between the Grim Reaper and the Stork. In 1960, 76 percent of all Catholics who entered the electorate between 1932 and 1960 considered themselves New Deal Democrats. Furthermore, 64 percent of all New Deal-generation Catholics actually voted and supported the Democratic nominee. By 1988, only 44 percent actually went to the polls and voted for the Democratic nominee. The decline was more pronounced among Catholic men than women. In between came the landslide Nixon election of 1972: though 60 percent of Catholics were Democrats, only 26 percent of the Democrats actually voted for George McGovern; 16 percent did not vote; and 58 percent went for Nixon. Chicago's

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Catholic mayor, Richard J. Daley, had been read out of the convention and replaced by "limousine liberals," black activists, "bra-burners," and "peaceniks," or so it seemed. But, despite the vote for Nixon, Republican party identification never rose above 35 percent among New Deal-generation Catholics.

The voting patterns are quite different for those who first entered the electorate in 1968 or after, the baby boomers and post-baby boomers. The first wave of boomers, if they connected with a political party at all, were Democrats. But they became Democrats at a rate about 10 percent lower than that of their parents. Moreover, the youngest members of this generation—the cohort entering the electorate in 1980 and thereafter—were nearly 20 percent less Democratic than their parents. By 1984, among the post-New Deal generation of Catholics, Republicans outnumbered Democrats; they were more likely to vote, and they were more likely to vote for their party's nominee. These voters were the Catholic margin for Reagan and Bush. And they could be a big part of the Republican party of the future. Many are found in the South, where they have migrated from New England or the upper Midwest in search of economic opportunity. Catholic post-boomers (the so-called Generation X) are every bit as Republican as Southern evangelical Protestants. Although it appears that Bill Clinton stanched the flow of young Catholics to the Republican party in 1992, that is primarily because of the massive movement of young Catholic women to him and the counter-movement of young Catholic men to Perot.

Does religion make people more Republican?

Some political scientists have made much of the finding that "more religious" people are likely to favor the Republicans. Typically their analyses use church attendance rates, or some measure of religious salience, the extent to which one considers religion important as a guide for daily life. Some leaders of the Christian Coalition see the potential here for political alliances among the "deeply religious," whether mainline Protestant, evangelical Protestant, or Catholic. The assumption seems to be that the Republicans' more traditional positions on abortion, homosexuality, school prayer, and family values are what attract the deeply religious, including Catholics. It is time to take a good look at this argument.

Republican party identification is much stronger among post-New Deal Catholics than among the New Deal generation, but church attendance is much lower among the younger group. Table 1 on page 14 presents a striking contrast. (It is based on the American National Election Studies, which have less of the over-sampling and over-reporting of religious activity hidden in Gallup telephone polls or election-day exit polls.)

The baby-boom generation (of white, non-Latino Catholics) did not connect with churches as closely as the generation that went through the Depression and World War II. It was

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Table 1

MASS ATTENDANCE BY CATHOLIC POLITICAL GENERATIONS

	New Deal		*Post-New Deal*	
	1988	**1992**	**1988**	**1992**
Every Week	51%	53%	23%	23%
Some Each Month	18	17	25	30
Seldom or Never	31	30	52	47
Totals	100%	100%	100%	100%
(Number of Cases)	(135)	(187)	(193)	(241)

(Source: American National Election Studies, 1988, 1992)

widely assumed they would do so when they married, had children, and settled down. But if the boomers have become regular churchgoers, it might well be at a nondenominational suburban megachurch, not the church of their parents. If they have connected with Catholic parishes, their attendance patterns often resemble those of mainline Protestants, not the regular attendance of younger evangelical Protestants or older Catholics. These patterns are replicated on the religious salience measure as well. *The political irony here is that young, regular-attending evangelical Protestants and young, far less frequent-attending Catholics have both been attracted to the Republican party.*

But isn't it the weekly Mass attenders, regardless of political generation, who identify with and support the Republican party? No.

Regular churchgoers identify as Democrats in almost identical proportions—50 percent of the New Dealers and 52 percent of the post-New Dealers. But in actual numbers, twice as many of the older generation are Democrats. Republican strength is concentrated among the occasional church attenders, particularly in the baby-boom generation; 51 percent are Republicans, and their actual numbers are 68 percent greater than the regular attenders who are Republican. Even the never-attending boomers far outweigh the regular attenders in the Republican ranks—by about 72 percent. *In short, 77 percent of younger Catholics who identify with the Republican party attend church occasionally, seldom, or never. Only 23 percent regularly attend Mass.*

Apart from their party identification, do more faithful churchgoers support the Republican nominee? There is slightly more evidence for this church attendance=Republican nominee equation among the older generation. But the recent picture is quite the opposite for younger voters. In the New Deal generation of regular church-attending Catholics, there was an almost even split in the Clinton and Bush votes in 1992—42 and 44 percent respectively—despite the 50 percent to 36 percent advantage in party identification favoring Democrats. But among young Catholics who are regular churchgoers, 46 percent voted for Clinton and only 32 percent cast their ballot for Bush. Bush's greatest strength came from young, occasional churchgoers: 44 percent chose him, only 30 percent chose Clinton, and 26 percent drifted to Perot. Once again, if one examines where the Republican votes were concentrated among young Catholics in 1992, 78 percent came from those who attend church occasionally, seldom, or never. *It is an enormous mistake to say that Republican support is concentrated among deeply religious Catholics.* In recent elections, Democratic presidential candidates have done very well there, as well as among those of the older generation who seldom attend Mass.

Furthermore, it is an even greater mistake to assume that the family-values platform is what attracts young Catholics to the Republican party. Quite the contrary. The older generation responds to those appeals but continues to vote Democratic—even half of the weekly Mass attenders. *On social issue after issue, the younger generation—especially those who vote Republican—are far more moderate than the Republican party's platform.*

Consider abortion—a centerpiece of the New Majoritarian strategy designed to attract Catholics to the Republican party. (Table 2 on page 15 provides stark contrasts.) Among younger Catholics, only 6 percent embraced the Republican platform favoring the life of the fetus over the life of the mother. Over half of all younger Catholics wanted abortion to be freely available. Over 40 percent wanted abortion limited to hard cases. Clearly, the views on abortion of young Catholics—and young Republican Catholics—contrast sharply with those of older Catholics. They are also at variance with the abortion views of the young evangelical Protestants now at the core of the Republican party.

Even using measures of church attendance and religious salience in 1992, faithful young Catholics are neither with the pope and bishops nor with the Republican party on abortion. For example, 45 percent more of the weekly churchgoers want abortion freely available than want it outlawed (25 percent as opposed to 17 percent). Where the Republican strength is concentrated—among the occasional-church-attending young Catholics—only 1 percent want abortion outlawed and 41 percent want it freely available. Most older Catholics, regardless of frequency of attendance, want abortion available for tough cases, but most younger Catholics split their preferences between abortion in tough cases and ready access to abortion.

What about other parts of the cultural-issues agenda? Younger people, including those who attend Mass regularly and those who support the Republican party, are more moderate in their judgments about gays and lesbians and more supportive of gay rights than are older Catholics who support the Democratic party. They are also more tolerant of the religious fundamentalists and members of the Christian Right who are active in politics. In fact, the least tolerant are regular church-attending, older Catholics—precisely the Catholic cohort more attracted to the family-values agenda. Paradoxical? Probably not. They have lived long enough to have known the religious and political intolerance of these Protestant groups. Younger Catholics are slightly more likely to embrace public school prayer, but this modest differ-

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ence is concentrated among the occasional churchgoers. Regular Mass attenders, among both the young and their elders, are cooler to the idea. Their suspicion has deep roots in American Catholicism; it was one of the reasons for the founding of Catholic parochial schools.

Economic vs. cultural politics

When we examine how Catholics rated the most important issue in recent presidential elections, we find some clues about the paradoxical voting patterns of the political generations. In both 1988 and 1992, regular church-attending, New Deal-generation Catholics were more likely than their younger counterparts to identify economic issues as more important than cultural issues. The less-frequent-church-attenders among younger Catholics are much more likely to list cultural issues. Far from the family-values agenda, the issues that concern them are crime, affirmative action, rights for racial minorities, immigration, and the use of tax money to benefit such people. Their worries are quite distant from the social agenda of the bishops' pastoral letters. Often these young Catholics express negative feelings about racial or ethnic issues. The men complain about too much opportunity for pushy women. These attitudes may reflect isolation from Catholic social teaching.

On most economic issues, older and younger Catholics are fairly close to each other. Interesting differences appear to be linked to the frequency of church attendance. Weekly churchgoers among older Catholics are slightly more supportive of government spending for the poor generally; weekly attenders among young Catholics overwhelmingly support government spending for the homeless. In this era of restructuring and cutbacks in government support for the poor, the strongest support for *increased* government spending comes among occasional churchgoers—including the young who support the Republican party.

By this point, if readers are not thoroughly confused, they are surely asking: What is it that has attracted young Catholics to the Republican party or repelled them from the Democrats? Is it the economic opportunity arguments of the Gingrich-Kemp Republican party? Not even that interpretation holds up under careful data analysis. The only evidence I can offer, other than some of this cohort's negative opinions about cultural issues, is the charismatic appeal of Ronald Reagan, who was president when the boomers and post-boomers connected with the parties. He seems to have convinced young Catholics, particularly those less exposed to church teaching, that his vision for the country and his handling of the economy were better. There are significant differences in retrospective feelings toward Reagan's handling of the economy between older and younger Catholics. Those younger Catholics who overwhelmingly approved of his economic policies were those who occasionally, seldom, or never went to church. Older Catholics were evenly split regardless of their level of religious involvement. By 1992, George Bush had frittered away that advantage; many young Catholic men defected to Perot and many young Catholic women settled on Clinton. The man who had brought them to the Republican party was gone and they were lifting anchor.

Table 2

ABORTION ATTITUDES BY CATHOLIC POLITICAL GENERATIONS

	New Deal	*Post-New Deal*
Outlaw abortion	18%	6%
Abortion permitted for rape, incest, life of mother	34	26
Abortion permitted for other reasons	15	16
Abortion available as personal choice	33	52
Totals	100%	100%
(Number of Cases)	(184)	(231)

(Source: American National Election Studies, 1992)

Young Catholic women

While young Catholic men, like some of their fathers' generation, have been attracted to the Republicans' stances on affirmative action, women's rights, crime, etc., young Catholic women are increasingly pulled to the Democrats. A fundamental economic revolution accounts for this. Young Catholic women are the least likely of any Christian group to be full-time housewives. In twenty short years, the proportion of Catholic women who are housewives has dropped from 48 percent to only 16 percent. It has plunged for Protestants too, with only 21 percent of evangelical Protestant women and 22 percent of mainline Protestant women remaining outside the labor force. But there are differences.

More than a generation ago, Catholic women began receiving higher educations at rates higher than the general public. A much larger proportion of Catholic women than of evangelical women are in professional and managerial occupations. Currently the gender gap is closing in these ranks; 47 percent of all professional and managerial jobs are filled by women. The income gap is closing, too. Instead of earning 71 cents on every dollar that a man earns, women in professional and managerial ranks earn 90 cents on the dollar. Men no longer have a huge advantage over women in the economy. Affirmative-action and equal-pay policies have reduced labor-market discrimination. It should come as no surprise that younger white men, including Catholics, are mobilized by Republican wedge-issue appeals. Or that women, including Catholics, are drawn increasingly to the Democratic side. Women have developed a political voice different from that of men.

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The Grim Reaper is claiming the New Deal generation. In 1968, when the first group of the baby-boom generation entered the electorate, 74 percent of all Catholic voters were still from the New Deal generation. Twenty years later, when George Bush gained a majority among Catholics who identified with a political party, only 39 percent of the Catholic electorate was from the New Deal generation, a loss of half of that Democratic and faithfully Catholic generation. That is why Republicans smile about the future of the Catholic vote. But the celebration may be premature—maybe even for 1996.

None of the generation that claimed to be the true heirs of Ronald Reagan—Jack Kemp, Patrick Buchanan, Dan Quayle, Newt Gingrich, Bill Bennett—won the Republican presidential nomination. Instead, Bob Dole, a career politician who was in Washington while Ronald Reagan was still in Hollywood, is the current hope of the party. And the party has moved a long way to the right of the historic Senator Dole and Governor Reagan. When the New Majoritarians first tried to attract Catholics and evangelicals to the Republican fold, they had no idea that there would be a massive realignment of evangelicals, who now control a majority of Republican state party organizations, or that the generation of Catholics most attracted to the party would be cultural moderates or liberals, not conservatives.

They also had no idea that Catholics would pay less attention to the advice of their religious leaders than evangelicals pay to theirs. Our research routinely shows that evangelical Protestants are the religious group most likely to be aware of political cues from their leaders; Catholics are far less likely to be similarly aware, and mainline Protestants least likely. Work by Lyman Kellstedt on the 1994 Congressional elections tells a compelling story. Forty-three percent of church-going evangelicals felt their church leaders were advising them how to vote; 71 percent went to the polls, and 94 percent of these voters selected the Republican candidate. That is a kept flock. You probably would have to go to New York City's Irish parishes over a century ago to find anything like it among Catholics. Evangelicals and the Christian Coalition say to Republicans: We can deliver and we have the track record to prove it. That is both the opportunity and the problem that Dole faces in 1996.

Dole's political experts know that previous Republican candidates have reached about all the Catholic Democratic crossover voters of the New Deal generation that they can. President Clinton's veto of the partial-birth abortion act may attract a few more. But abortion is only one item in the Republican effort to paint Bill and Hillary Clinton as the full-grown progeny of the 1972 Democratic convention: Remember the party of amnesty, acid, and abortion? Dole has to reach the Republican-leaning, post-New Deal Catholics who are far more moderate (or permissive, depending on one's perspective) on the social issues. How can he do it and keep the Republican foot soldiers of the Religious Right loyal? The year-long struggle to moderate the abortion plank, and the Republican convention's avoidance of anti-abortion rhetoric, were symptomatic of this dilemma.

Dole's selection of Jack Kemp as his running mate was a major effort to slip between the horns of that dilemma. Kemp is a genuine born-again Christian dating to the 1960s, long before other politicians grasped its political mileage. He is anti-abortion. That keeps the evangelical foot-soldiers marching. But most important for Dole, Kemp was a seer of the "opportunity society's" vision of the economy who still recognized the need for substantial social and educational spending. This resonates with young Catholics. The problem for Dole was that he did not like Kemp and thought that supply-side economics was wacky. The first law of politics, however, is to get what you can and tolerate what you must. Bob Dole knows whose votes he needs to move into 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. Kemp is not just the driver but the van line for young Catholics.

Another effort to slip between the horns of the dilemma was to choose a prochoice but economically conservative Catholic member of the House as keynote speaker. A swiftly rising star, divorced, remarried, and a mother, Susan Molinari of Staten Island, New York, was one of the few available Republican women who could appeal to this critical part of the post-New Deal generation of Catholics. Dole cannot afford a hemorrhage of younger Catholic professional and managerial women to Clinton. Molinari is known for championing Republican policies that would help small business, where recent starts are disproportionately by younger women.

A friend of mine calls this the "secular Catholic" strategy. When social issues predominate and the language gets strident, young Catholic voters move to the Democrats. When that language can be muted so that appeals to economic opportunity are heard, young Catholic voters move to the Republicans. In this strategy, if the bishops castigate Clinton on abortion or Gingrich-Dole on welfare, it probably won't penetrate to younger Catholics as effectively as the campaigners' own appeals. This has got to be maddening to the bishops; but they must continue to do what they do: offer thoughtful statements about religion and democracy and about the full-range of moral issues in the campaign, while avoiding even the appearance of partisanship.

There have been increasing efforts to unite evangelicals and Catholics under the Republican tent. To recruit Catholics, the Christian Coalition set up a special organization that appropriated Catholic labels—the League of Catholic Voters and the Catholic Alliance. Parish lists have been used for direct mail appeals that give the appearance of common interests. Ralph Reed, executive director of the Christian Coalition, has quoted selectively from social-science research that shows common political interests. But other research by Ted Jelen shows that parts of the evangelical coalition don't trust Catholics any more than they trust Jews or atheists. And the bishops are not about to turn over their teaching authority to Pat Robertson, Ralph Reed, or to the Catholics among the coalition's executives and volunteers.

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Given these facts, why are the press and politicians paying so much attention to Catholics in 1996—especially when a "secular Catholic" strategy is the one most likely to yield votes? My research shows that the importance of Catholics *as Catholics* in the electorate has diminished since 1960. In 1960, 41 per cent of all adults were mainline Protestants, and 17 percent of the voters were active churchgoers from mainline Protestant bodies. By 1992, these figures had shrunk to 22 percent and 4 percent. The mainline is the sideline. But active Catholic churchgoers have not filled this vacuum. In 1960, non-Latino, white Catholics were 18 percent of the adult population but, like mainline Protestants, regular churchgoing Catholics were 17 percent of the voters. By 1992, they had grown to 20 percent of the population but had shrunk to 8 percent of the electorate. (Latino Catholics who regularly attend Mass are still less than 2 percent of the electorate.) Who has filled the vacuum? Evangelical Protestants who attend church regularly are 10 percent of the voters and unchurched Americans are 15 percent. The power to define the American political agenda has shifted from centrist religious groups like mainline Protestants and Catholics to more polar groups of evangelical Protestants and secularists. Therein is found much of the current story of American elections and the so-called "culture wars."

If there is a Catholic story in 1996 it will not be found among the faithful Mass-goers of the dying New Deal generation, but in the less-involved younger Catholics who have little in common with other religious groups now prominent in the Republican party.

Electoral college politics

So then, are Catholics important in 1996, or not? Yes, because presidential elections are won and lost in the electoral college. Since 1980, every Republican has entered the election

A parallel account

Who are the people behind the political statistics? Samuel G. Freedman's *The Inheritance: How Three Families and America Moved from Roosevelt to Reagan and Beyond* (Simon & Schuster, $27.95, 464 pp.) provides a parallel account to David Leege's demographics on Catholic voters—the stories of three Catholic families who over three generations shifted from Roosevelt to Reagan.

Freedman traces the political choices of the Burgios and Trottas, the Garretts and Careys, the Obryckis and Maebys—Italian, Irish, Polish families—from the immigrant generation to the third generation. He masterfully sets forth how they chose their parties, how they cast their votes, how social and economic forces directed those choices, and most movingly how personal experience and feelings, from gratitude to resentment, shaped these political responses.

Silvio Burgio, an orphan and slum dweller, becomes a master plumber of tenaciously high standards, a union man of exemplary loyalty, and a New Deal Democrat. Comes the sixties and the civil rights movement and his union, all white, all Italian, becomes the object of demonstrations, state hearings, and federal suits. The class and race resentments that flow do not seem to touch Burgio, or even his son-in-law Frank Trotta, Sr., who steadily tries to keep a New Rochelle, New York, housing project warm, clean, and in good repair for the sake of the older tenants and in the face of graffiti-writing, drug-dealing, disorderly younger tenants. But grandson Frank Trotta, Jr., from his high-school days an active Republican, works for Richard Nixon, Lew Lehrman, and New York State Assembly representative, Joseph Pisani. Finally as much disheartened by Republican machine politics as he ever was by the Democratic machine, Trotta steps back from partisan politics, only to find himself on Lincoln's birthday 1990 lecturing his fellow lawyers at the American Bar Association on the similarities between *Roe* v. *Wade* and the *Dred Scott* decision.

Tim Carey is the grandson of Lizzie Sanford Garrett, Irish mother, neighborhood refuge, and political organizer. During the Depression, Lizzie and her husband Edward were so broke they had to leave one of Manhattan's worst slums for a shanty town up the Hudson—a place so miserable that no town services or Republican town supervisor ever visited, not until Lizzie began organizing her neighbors and found some Democrats willing to treat them as equals. Tim ends up a Republican who campaigns for Ronald Reagan and most recently New York Governor George Pataki. His efforts are built on his down-to-earth knowledge of ordinary people, mostly Catholic like himself. October 21, 1967, was a political turning point in his life. He stood with the 503rd military police battalion protecting the Pentagon against a mammoth antiwar demonstration. It never occurred to him that his army service was anything but the ordinary duty of a good American. When he heard Dick Gregory tell the crowd that only "poor blacks" and "dumb whites" filled the army ranks, his political inclinations were set in a new direction, not just contrary to the demonstrators, but to his whole family.

The Inheritance is a brilliant, sobering, and deeply moving book. Where others decry voter cynicism, Freedman sees astute political actors ready to vote what they see as their own and the country's best interests.

MARGARET O'BRIEN STEINFELS

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

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

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with about a 200-vote bonus. The South, parts of the Midwest, and the Mountain states are not likely to go Democrat. Thus Democrats must scare up 268 of the remaining 326 electoral votes. This is possible if the winner takes all the electoral votes in California, Texas, Florida, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, and Michigan. Success also requires some erosion among the smaller states in the Republican phalanx. The contested states are also the states with Catholic pluralities.

Evangelicals will stay with the Republican nominee; 40 percent of all voters have disliked the Clintons from December 1992 on, and many are evangelicals. Evangelicals are the core of the contemporary Republican party and they have displaced mainline Protestants in the party leadership. Blacks, Jews, and non-Cuban Hispanics will remain Democratic. Secularists will split, opting for the Democrats if social issues get strident and for the Republicans or Perot if economic prosperity is threatened. The mystery—beyond the size of the election-day turnout in each group—is with post-New Deal Catholics, a Republican-leaning group. They hold the balance of power. It is not Catholic leaders who will deliver them by the reiteration of profound social teachings, but opportunistic pollsters and political advisers who understand a generation that is not tightly woven into the church. A little nudge in turnout here, a little defection there, will make all the difference in the outcome. Clinton turned this complex Catholic mosaic to his advantage in 1992, but he is less likely to benefit from a Perot hemorrhage of Republican voters in 1996.

The campaigners will use every Catholic symbol they can—from school vouchers to school uniforms, from the family fallout caused by corporate down-sizing to the threat to the safety net for the poor and elderly. Aiming at younger Catholics, Dole will look as Reaganesque as he can—announcing a tax-cut plan while promising a balanced budget is as authentically Reagan as you can get. And he has Kemp. In an effort to retain young Catholic women and maybe pull a few men, Democrats will hammer at the loss of free choice on abortion and float the specter of an evangelical theocracy. Democrats will remind women of the limited opportunity for economic advancement before affirmative-action and equal-pay policies became law.

Have yourself some fun. Keep a list of every issue in the campaign. Ask: Is that a symbol of something Catholics hold dear, or one they reject? Is the appeal aimed at reinforcing the New Dealers or at attracting the post-New Dealers? What appeals will more effectively court young Catholic women? Which appeals are aimed at the fears of men? Who is using Reagan nostalgia most effectively—Dole, Kemp, or even Clinton? In which states do the big campaign advertisement buys occur and which themes appear in the ads? When someone else campaigns with the candidates in the crucial states, what kinds of Catholics do they hope to attract? Answering these questions will give you a pretty comprehensive outline of the campaign discourse in election 1996. And you might even have an interesting voter guide. □

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Richard Alleva

TWO HOLES IN ONE

'Emma' & 'Tin Cup'

In the title role of Douglas McGrath's film version of *Emma*, Gwyneth Paltrow was executing one of her character's many little social maneuvers when a woman seated in front of me clucked her tongue, shook her head, and murmured, with mingled affection and dismay, "She is really *something else*!" Up to then I knew I had been enjoying the movie, but that remark made me realize why. McGrath and Paltrow understand what Emma is. Essentially without occupation but possessed of demonic energy, she tries to make her little corner of the world perfectly happy and ends up wreaking havoc. With the exception of the utterly evil Madame de Merteuil of *Les Liaisons Dangereuses*, Emma may be the most manipulative woman ever created by a novelist, yet who can doubt her essential benevolence? Bright, magnetic, gracious herself and the rouser of graciousness in others, she is also (in critic Ronald Blythe's phrase) a "smug Surrey goddess." Lionel Trilling was right to remark, in his brilliant critique of the novel, that one does not know how to have Emma. She is quietly infuriating, but wouldn't you rather party with her than with the selfless heroine of *Persuasion*? Of all Jane Austen's protagonists, of all the women in nineteenth-century fiction, Emma is the great Something Else.

Douglas McGrath understands, literally, where Emma is coming from. Under the credits, a cartoon Earth spins through the heavens, and soon we notice that the space on our planet is being hogged by that humongous country, England, but—can we credit our eyes!—there are only two big cities in England! One is called London, and the other is Highbury, which just happens to be the residence of Emma Woodhouse. This is, of course, a steal from that famous *New Yorker* cover which gave a Manhattanite's concept of geography, but it wonderfully expresses Emma's world view. Within her little kingdom, Miss Woodhouse rules and knows who must marry whom, even if she must exert herself to bring it about.

There is a wickedly defining moment early in the movie when Emma and her protégée, poor simple Harriet, are seeking refuge from summer's heat in an arbor. Emma allows her friend to express admiration for the honest yeoman who is courting her. But then with quite another suitor in mind for her friend, Emma slyly insinuates that the current one has feet of clay. Poor Harriet's face falls, and she wonders what her benefactress would recommend? Emma leans forward in her chair and McGrath suddenly cuts back to a very long shot and nothing more can be heard of the conversation, but the thrust of Paltrow's extended body is as powerful as a ballerina's while the line of her long, delicate neck is as graceful as a swan's. But a swan can be vicious at times, can't it? Emma is just about to launch Harriet toward the first of three romantic debacles.

Yet Emma is *not* vicious, and the way Paltrow's face crumples when Mr. Knightly, her best friend, reproaches her for being sarcastic to a hapless bore at a picnic makes you remember and regret all the times when your own tongue was more acute than your heart. And this moment also shows McGrath's understanding that, in the world of Jane Austen (and occasionally in this great rough world outside her books), manners are morals, and that this is not a sign of overdelicacy.

Some of McGrath's staging is a little obvious (this is his maiden voyage), but he also pulls off a few beautiful sequences. And he recreates the *gentilesse* of the period so well that when, late in

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the story, Knightly angrily grabbed Emma's arm, the audience around me gasped. In the well-bred context, this mild violence seemed more shocking than a hail of bullets in a Tarrentino flick.

All the performances are at least good and, aside from Ms. Paltrow's, two are superb: Jeremy Northham makes Mr. Knightly so worthy of his name that even his sententiousness is absorbed by his charm. And Juliet Stevenson presents Mrs. Elton, one of Austen's most wonderful monsters, as a sort of lyrical caricature of Margaret Thatcher: so unreachable in her self-assurance that she seems to be moving within a portable glass bubble.

There are only two problems with this movie. First, McGrath doesn't know what to do with that remarkable character, Jane Fairfax, any more than Jane Austen did. Fairfax, Emma's nemesis, is a George Eliot character astray in Austen territory, an unfulfilled portrait in a nearly perfect work of art. (A few years ago, Joan Aiken wrote a novel with Fairfax as its heroine.) If Austen had fathomed this embryonic feminist, she might have expanded or exploded her book. The actress cast as Fairfax seemed a little too lacquered, more like Demi Moore in *Disclosure* than an orphan who's pulled herself up by her bootstraps. McGrath lets her fade away long before the conclusion is reached.

The stripping away of Austen's prose in order to present her story visually leads to an even more serious problem. As Robert Liddell, in *The Novels of Jane Austen*, points out, *Emma* is a kind of detective story, with romantic follies substituted for murders and Emma functioning as a madly incompetent sleuth. What's obvious to other characters remains opaque to her; what keeps the facts hidden from us, too, is the way Austen's prose adheres so strictly to Emma's point of view. Thus, Austen "snows" both her protagonist and her readers. But McGrath's camera reveals too soon the real love objects of Reverend Elton, Mr. Knightly, and the brash Frank Churchhill. If the movie Emma seems at times nearly a booby, it's only because, unlike the novelist, the director doesn't allow us to be boobies right along with her.

Never mind! Four big-screen adaptations of Austen in two years (I'm including the delightful Los Angeles transposition of *Emma*, *Clueless*, but not the soporific TV travesty made out of *Pride and Prejudice*), and all of them fine. Has any classic writer ever enjoyed such a run of cinematic good luck?

Kevin Costner's good luck is called Ron Shelton. Between Shelton's baseball movie, *Bull Durham*, in which Costner was excellent, and the director-writer's new golf comedy, *Tin Cup*, in which Costner is even better, the actor appeared haplessly as numerous superheroes like Robin Hood and that aqua guy with fins in *Waterworld*. While some actors like Bette Davis and John Gielgud must never stoop to conquer, never play ordinary mortals, others should never play anything but. Whenever you see him as a swashbuckler, you may soon become aware of how chinless Costner is, and how much better his lanky frame would look in chino trousers than in tights. But as Roy McAvoy, an ordinary man with two extraordinary qualities—his erratic golfing genius and his consistent bullheadedness—this actor gives us a Hemingway hero for these post-Hemingway times, not a stoic old titan tacitly watching sharks nibble away his big catch, but a fool persisting in his folly until a kind of wisdom, and a good woman, are won. Slamming his ball again and again into a lake instead of taking par and moving up to the green, McAvoy sends spasms of agony into the crowd watching, and we in the theater may groan, too; but Rene Russo, as the love of McAvoy's life, knows better. She dissolves into giggles, shakes her head, and delivers the right verdict: "He's crazy!"

Shelton's direction finds suspense in the arc of a golf ball in flight, and comedy in the verbal dueling between a player and his caddy, prima donnas both. His moviemaking is as relaxed and yet as purposeful as a good golfer's stroke.

In *Emma*, the heroine finds happiness by abandoning folly and finding her niche. Though Douglas McGrath is American, his movie, true to its source, is utterly European. In *Tin Cup*, the hero finds happiness by persisting in his folly and carving out his own niche. This is a very American movie. □

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Frank McConnell

THE RIGHT HAND OF GOD

PBS looks at the political prophets

With God on Our Side: The Rise of the Religious Right in America" is a six-hour documentary series premiering on PBS on September 27, 1996 (check local listings for time and dates). It is one of the most stunning, bound-to-be controversial things ever done by them, and it could not be more timely. Just about as the series ends, Americans will go to the polls and choose the president who will lead this nation into the third millennium. As the series makes clear, that choice will be determined in large part by the tireless, sometimes clandestine but more often blatant activities of the Religious Right—that is, for this show, mainly white, mainly male, mainly Protestant fundamentalist conservatives who believe that America's destiny is to be the shining kingdom of the Lord on earth.

"With God on Our Side" traces, with original footage and contemporary interviews, the unexpected rise of the Religious Right since the late forties, and especially its intricate, almost balletic, interaction with the direction of the nation-at-large. From Billy Sunday through Billy Graham to Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, Jim and Tammy Faye Bakker and on to Randall Terry, Phyllis Schlafly, and the truly remarkable Ralph Reed, it documents how winning the presidency, from Eisenhower to the upcoming election, has more and more become a matter of wooing and placating this group.

Now that may be a good thing, if you believe that America really is destined to be God's country—the Christian God's country. If you don't, you may be rather more alarmed. Producers Calvin Skaggs's and David Van Taylor's documentarism is as disinterested (cold?) as the great work of the Maysle Brothers (*Salesman*, 1969; *Gimme Shelter*, 1971). They show what was *there*, they film what is said now about what happened then, and they let the images and utterances resonate in the silence they generate. We hear the voice of the young pastor Jerry Falwell, in the sixties, telling his congregation that Martin Luther King, Jr., is highly suspect in his motives, probably Socialist-connected, and that ministers of the gospel have no business meddling in politics. We see the present-day Falwell staring into the camera and explaining that he was merely speaking as one Baptist minister to another. No editorial comment: none, really, needed.

Well, except one. I must tell you that I am not objective. I find the Religious Right a hybrid of politics and faith that brings out my Voltairean instincts. Many of the people who appear on "With God on Our Side" are good, well-intentioned, admirable folk; but others, and those, some of the most prominent in the history of the movement, are, by any human reckoning, vile. And some of the vile ones, still thriving, are going to have a lot to say about whether Dole or Clinton—both of whom are equally slavish in courting them—will occupy the White House.

It's a problem specific to Christianity. Ever since Constantine, in 313, made it the official religion of the Roman Empire, the church has had trouble deciding whether it's a force in the world, or a force for the world. Augustine distinguished the City of God from the City of Man, but didn't tell us enough about how to keep them apart. Dante, in *De Monarchia*, said that the pope and the emperor should be like twin and equal suns: great, but who shines on you today? Luther, two centuries later, unleashed the greatest surge of spiritual individualism in Western history—only to react savagely against the Peasants' Revolt that his own vision brought forth.

America only made things worse—or more interesting. John Winthrop, in a great sermon before the landing at Plymouth Rock, told the pilgrims that the new land would be God's land, "a city on a hill." And that vision has informed our culture permanently. But so has the contrary vision of Franklin, Adams, and Jefferson—non-Christians and Deists all—that America would be the first truly *rationally* constructed society in history. We have been haunted by the ancient warfare of the prophet and the professional.

And the prophets—this is the point of the series—have been winning, at least in presidential politics, for about forty years now. Here's a short, and therefore caricature, summary of the six-hour story. Humiliated by the ridicule they incurred during the Scopes trial in the twenties, fundamentalists retreated altogether from politics until the late for-



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ties when communism gave them a bona-fide devil to fight. The preacher who emerged as the most charismatic—and most ambitious—was Billy Graham. Truman didn't like Graham; Eisenhower, whose brilliant management skills have still not been appreciated, kept him at a distance; Nixon adored him—for Kennedy and Johnson he was irrelevant—and Nixon kept him as a kind of house pet, a living guarantor of Nixon's own moral stature. Nixon's fall was Billy's eclipse. Forget Ford: history will. Carter, surely our greatest *ex*-president, tried to bring an especially benign evangelism *into* the White House, and was sacrificed to his own good will. Along comes Reagan, who shamelessly romanced the evangelists, Falwell and the up-and-coming Pat Robertson, smarter and better on camera than Brother Jerry.

And now the serious action begins. 1988: Robertson decides to run for president against Bush and he starts winning in the primaries. He even prays in public for the Lord to avert a hurricane from the East Coast, and, what do you know, the hurricane changes course. Things look dim for the professionals. But there's already been the Jim and Tammy Faye scandal, and Bush has the Dirty Harry of all campaign managers, the late Lee Atwater (the man who made Willy Horton Dukakis's running mate), working for him. And what do you know: the Jimmy Swaggert scandal breaks, just in time to kill Robertson's chances for the nomination.

And it worked. Robertson threw his votes to Bush, and Bush won.

But all is not well. Now the Religious Right understands that it holds the whip hand, not the major parties. Bush—who emerges, at least here, as a decent fellow trying to do decent things in a secular world—displeases the evangelicals by doing things like outlawing hate crimes against gays and lesbians, and actually allowing gays into the White House. And meanwhile the baton has passed from the aging, increasingly avuncular Pat Robertson to the young, gung-ho glib, rosycheeked, wouldn't-you-like-*your*-daughter-to-date-this-guy Ralph Reed, head of the Christian Coalition and very likely the canniest fellow in the whole story.

Reed, as he says in a remarkably candid interview on the show, understands something none of the other prophets has: that all politics begins at the local level, and *builds* to the presidency. His coalition, he says, is an attempt to bring together economic conservatives with life-style conservatives: and he seems to be succeeding remarkably well. His conciliatory attitude, in the last episode, is countered by cross-cut interviews with Randall Terry, the founder of Operation Rescue, who will have none of Reed's moderation, and who insists upon an immediate transformation of multicultural America into a Bible-believing nation.

As Wallace Stevens wrote, "The imperfect is our paradise." The American dream has always been that politics and religion could work together. If it does nothing else, this marvelous series indicates to what extent that dream remains a dream. □

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Trust, but verify

Active Faith
How Christians are Changing the Soul of American Politics
Ralph Reed
The Free Press, $25, 311 pp.

R. Scott Appleby

One wants to believe Ralph Reed. In *Active Faith*, the executive director of the Christian Coalition endeavors to polish the image of the Religious Right (or, as he prefers, the "profamily movement"). Thus he eschews the vitriolic and triumphalist rhetoric, the demonizing of enemies, the uncompromising moral fervor, the unrealistic political expectations, the appearance of callousness toward underprivileged minorities, the hint of racism, and, most of all, the unprofessional approach and flawed political strategy that, he says, characterized the first wave of the movement in the 1980s. Instead, Reed offers compelling statements of compassion for the poor and oppressed, declarations of respect for political opponents, homilies on the virtues of gradualism and the limited capacity of politics to achieve true social reform, and promises of "a higher standard in truth and civility."

During the heyday of the Moral Majority and other fundamentalist/conservative evangelical lobbying groups, Protestant preachers ran the show—or thought they did. Flattered by the obsequies of Republican party strategists, who coveted the mailing lists and untapped grassroots power of the electronic church, the preachers relished their moment in the Washington spotlight but neglected the hard work of building a viable grassroots movement. They lacked their own savvy and seasoned political operatives capable of realizing the enormous potential represented by thousands of politically inexperienced religious conservatives willing for the first time to enter the fray.

If anyone ever qualified as a "savvy and seasoned political operative" at the tender age of twenty-nine, it was Ralph Reed. Pat Robertson, in the wake of his failed candidacy for the Republican presidential nomination in 1988, saw in the young Emory Ph.D. and former executive director of the national College Republicans, a kindred spirit capable of organizing the troops and training would-be candidates in the fine art of contesting elections for the local school board, state assembly, Congress, and state Republican party committee. Reed has proved Robertson a shrewd judge of talent: In less than six years Reed built the Christian Coalition from its initial base of 5,000 Robertson supporters to its present strength of 1.7 million members and 2,000 local chapters. In political terms, as Reed is fond of reminding readers, the profamily movement has arrived—and just in time to take advantage of a factionalized political environment characterized less by party loyalty than by special-interest advocacy. Christian Coalition members are "people of faith first, Americans second, and Republicans or Democrats third." They seek to limit government, reinvigorate the family, and restore the culture's Judeo-Christian principles—goals shared, Reed suggests, by 30 million conservative evangelical Christians.

Calming lingering fears of a hidden theocratic agenda is the first order of business. "Unlike fundamentalist political movements in the Middle East, religious conservatives in the United States are properly understood as an interest group within a democratic order. If they gained power, they would not repeal the Constitution or attempt to impose their religion on others through the state," Reed writes. Not to be indulged are Christian Reconstructionists (with whom Robertson has dallied in the past), or any other fringe groups that seek to impose biblical law through direct political action. At the same time, Reed avers, most religious conservatives labor under a tradition of sectarian withdrawal from the world and need desperately to develop "a theology of direct political action."

Reed says all the right things, at least to these Catholic ears. On Clinton-bashing: "Make no mistake about it: we do ourselves and our nation harm when we sacrifice the principle of respect for those in authority—a principle clearly laid out in Scripture and practiced by Christ—in the interest of short-term political gain." On race relations he acknowledges "the painful truth" that

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"liberals have been correct throughout history on issues of social justice while we have been neglectful or derelict in applying the principles of our faith to establishing justice in a fallen world. When it came to racism, where were conservative evangelicals? They were not only on the sidelines, but on the wrong side of the most central cause of social justice in this century."

On abortion, Reed's 180-word draft of a prolife plank for the GOP platform quotes Mother Teresa and Pope John Paul II and urges reform of foster care and adoption systems that would support compassionate and humane alternatives to abortion (for example, making transracial adoptions easier). With regard to the inchoate partnership between evangelicals and conservative Catholics, Reed reports that he has assured "sympathetic members of the American bishops' conference" that "we do not wish to speak for the Roman Catholic church or to usurp the authority of the bishops, which we respect." To the rejoinder of a Catholic activist, that Catholics already have a political home ("It's called the Catholic church"), Reed answers that the social teaching of the church has encouraged Catholic laity to greater political involvement, but it lacks a vehicle like the Catholic Alliance, the new wing of the Christian Coalition, that Reed hopes will increase Catholic participation in the profamily movement by 250,000 this year and by more than 2 million by the year 2000.

Reed puts all this forward in a winning way, in a calm and assured authorial voice that is conversational and inviting, candid, and at times charming. He impresses with balance and common sense. Welcome doses of civility, political daring, and independent thinking are evident.

Also on display, alas, are facile analogies (for example, Clinton as the American Gorbachev), a superficial and ideologically driven reading of American religious history, and an occasional tone of condescension. More disturbing are the self-contradictions that erode confidence in the author's sincerity or self-knowledge. Religious conservatives, Reed insists repeatedly, are "reluctant political actors" for whom the most important issue is not "the economy, stupid" but rather "...the culture, the family, a loss of values, a decline in civility, and the destruction of our children." Thus it was Patrick Buchanan's moral stand, not his economic protectionism, that won the allegiance of Christian Coalition voters in the 1996 Iowa and New Hampshire primaries.

Elsewhere, however, Reed reports the results of a 1993 poll in which evangelical voters listed the economy and jobs as their top issue, followed by taxes and the deficit, with abortion and other social issues ranking low among the voters' priorities. Reed cites this "startling revelation" as justification for his controversial decision to broaden the coalition's agenda to include economic proposals not overtly related to thorny "culture wars" issues less amenable to political solutions. It was hardly coincidental, however, that Reed formulated this mainstreaming strategy after the media blamed the profamily movement for the divisive 1992 Republican convention in Houston.

In the struggle to play big-time politics without losing their religious moorings, conservative evangelicals face a dilemma. If they form their political judgments consistently on the basis of their literalist biblical heritage, they can expect continued misunderstandings, suspicions, and even charges of anti-Semitism and other forms of bigotry (as Robertson discovered). If, on the other hand, they downplay arcane theology and apocalyptic religious imagination, as Reed does throughout *Active Faith*, critics inside and outside the fold may accuse them of abandoning the true faith and selling out to the political establishment.

Such attacks on Reed's integrity and faith are patently unfair, but he doesn't help matters with statements like the following: "In 1983 I made a faith commitment and began to attend an evangelical church in Washington. My religious beliefs never changed my views on the issues to any great degree, because my political philosophy was already well developed."

Such candid comments are the great strength of *Active Faith*. But they also suggest that Reed the political operative may sometimes, for tactical reasons, prefer to emphasize style over substance, process over outcome, the carrot of compromise over the stick of conviction. One wonders about the book itself in this regard. Is one gullible to interpret in the best possible light the occasional passages that might otherwise raise doubts about the sincerity, or self-knowledge, of this gifted public Christian? Can Reed hold an increasingly diverse coalition of profamily, antiliberal activists to high standards of civility and Christian love? If so, "people of faith" everywhere will applaud his success.

I believe, Mr. Reed. Help my unbelief. □

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R. Scott Appleby *is the director of the Cushwa Center for the Study of American Catholicism at the University of Notre Dame.*

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KIDS HAVING KIDS: WHAT TO DO?

Dubious Conceptions
The Politics of Teen-age Pregnancy
Kristin Luker
Harvard University Press, $24.95, 283 pp.

Barbara Dafoe Whitehead

The single pregnant teenager has unfairly become a lightning rod for public anger, says Kristin Luker in her provocative critique of public thinking on early pregnancy and childbearing. What's more, she argues, the political debate over what to do about unwed teen motherhood has been polarized by competing conceptions of its causes. The Right defines adolescent childbearing as moral breakdown which can be best addressed through moral exhortation. The Left sees the same behavior as a consequence of limited access to sex education, contraception, and abortion which can be changed by greater access to all of the above. Yet, according to Luker, neither side has an adequate grasp of the main causes of teen-age pregnancy and parenthood.

Drawing upon historical and social scientific evidence, she shows how both economic and cultural forces have contributed to the problems associated with early childbearing. On the economic side, she says, poverty is a chief contributor to teen motherhood. Early childbearing doesn't cause young women to become poor or welfare-dependent. Rather, poverty causes women to bear and raise children at an early age and to seek welfare assistance. For example, 80 percent of all teen-age mothers were living in poverty or near-poverty long before they became pregnant.

On the cultural side, Luker sees the sexual revolution as a chief contributor to changing attitudes and behavior among teen-age girls. After all, poor teen-age girls do not live on a separate planet, and their behavior has also been shaped by the changes in sex, marriage, and motherhood that have so dramatically reorganized American family life. The sexual revolution has all but erased the boundaries between adolescent and adult sexuality. A climate of permissiveness toward sex and parenthood outside of marriage exists for women of all ages.

Though patterns of female sexual behavior have been converging across age groups, there is a sharply divergent pattern in the way women of different socio-economic backgrounds deal with the consequences of their sexual and reproductive behavior. Middle-class teenagers follow a middle-class script: they



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postpone motherhood through some combination of abstinence, contraception, and abortion, get an education, enter the workforce, get married, and then begin their childbearing careers. Poor teen-agers seem to be moving in the opposite direction: having children early, leaving school early, and never marrying. Moreover, says Luker, even if these teen-agers followed the middle-class script, it wouldn't help them escape poverty.

Further, single motherhood is now subject to a means test. Unwed motherhood is okay for affluent, middle-aged women and not harmful to their children but not okay for young and poor teens and extremely harmful to their children. Indeed, suggests Luker, society subsidizes single motherhood for middle-class women through private health insurance coverage for expensive fertility treatments but "taxes" single motherhood for poor women by cutting welfare and family planning services.

As Luker sees it, this divergence enables mainstream America to turn on the poor. Public mean-spiritedness and censoriousness toward poor young mothers undermine support for the very approaches that seem to work to reduce the rate of teen pregnancy. We know how to help teen-agers postpone pregnancy and motherhood, argues Luker, but we are less willing to offer such help. For example, although there are sex education programs that can be effective in helping teen-agers avoid early pregnancy, "politically mobilized activists" push abstinence-based sex education into the schools before such programs have been properly evaluated.

Given her sense of the hostility of the public and the futility of the middle-class script, it's easy to understand why Luker throws up her hands in despair. Only an array of expensive social programs will abolish poverty, but the public is in no mood to be generous, she laments.

Fortunately, things may not be as bleak as Luker imagines. Though her book contains many valuable insights, its argument is flawed. First and foremost, its defining premise is weak. Far from displaying an animus toward pregnant teens, the public is more solicitous of pregnant teen-agers than ever before. In local school districts across the nation, communities have made a conscientious effort to keep pregnant girls in school, providing them with counseling, health services, and in-school day care. Schools have lifted the stigma of early childbearing. Pregnant teens are cheerleaders, homecoming queens, and commencement speakers. Though there have been strenuous bipartisan efforts to alter the welfare system, these efforts have foundered whenever they have proposed harsh measures for fifteen-year-old girls and their babies. (As for "politically motivated" activists who push sex education programs into the schools, the ideological fervor cuts both ways. There are also sex advocates on the cultural left whose approaches to sex education are equally lacking in social-scientific validation.)

The public mood might better be described as sympathetic yet pragmatic. On the one hand, Americans believe in giving single teen-age mothers a second chance. On the other hand, they worry, often on practical rather than moral grounds, about institutionalizing early pregnancy and unwed teen motherhood. Based on their own life experience, adult Americans understand that the standards for even minimally effective childrearing are getting higher. In a postindustrial society, it takes two parents and often two incomes to give children the upbringing and education they will need to make it on their own.

Second, the socioeconomic evidence refutes Luker's speculative assertion that the middle-class script wouldn't work for poor teens even if they tried to follow it. A dual-income married couple household with children whose head has no education beyond high school enjoys a median family income in the upper half of the nation's income scale. This is not poverty.

Luker herself provides the evidence and argumentation for a more hopeful scenario. The problem isn't the effectiveness of the middle-class script but the obstacles that prevent the most disadvantaged and discouraged teen-agers from following it. It makes sense to direct public dollars and civic energies toward constructing a bridge to the middle-class script for girls who now see early motherhood as the only attainable path toward adulthood. □

"Of course we're only dealing in abstractions...."

Barbara Dafoe Whitehead's The Divorce Culture *will be published by Alfred A. Knopf in 1997.*

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RELIGION BOOKNOTES

Lawrence S. Cunningham

A perusal of most theological writing in this country would indicate that Continental authors are our theologians' most common conversation partners; our theological essays are studded with, mainly, French and German bibliography. Gill's anthology presents North American authors in dialogue with their British counterparts. As a consequence, the discourse and the issues tend to be framed somewhat differently.

Though Gill teaches in a British university, his selections are predominantly from this side of the Atlantic. Essays are organized under various headings. "Christ and the Academy" has only North American selections since the relation of theological disciplines to the larger work of the academy is more problematic in this country than in Great Britain. Similarly, the section on "God as Mother" actually consists of extended reactions, from both sides of the Atlantic, to Sallie McFague's feminist modeling of God. In the same vein, the discussion of "Christ and Post-Modernism" orbits around a critical analysis of Yale's George Lindbeck and his provocative *The Nature of Doctrine*. The sole British essay on Lindbeck is Don Cupitt's "After Liberalism." Cupitt is little discussed in this country but as far as I can make out he sets forth a theological vision not unlike that of Feuerbach.

Readings in Modern Theology: Britain & America
edited by Robin Gill
Abingdon Press, $26.95, 399 pp.

Much provocative thinking has been done in Great Britain on the uniqueness of Christianity. Although John Hick is not represented in this collection, his influential work stands behind much of the discussion. I was much taken with Gavin D'Costa's essay on constructing a Jewish-Christian theology.

This anthology also presents authors well known to American readers: on science and theology the physicist and Anglican priest John Polkinghorne; systematics professor Nicholas Lash; the fine writer on spirituality (now bishop), Rowan Williams; the essays of the younger theologian, Sarah Coakley (now at Harvard), and Edinburgh's James Mackey.

In sum: a wide-ranging collection culled mainly from journal articles and indicating that there is a fruitful discussion occurring within the Anglophone world; a discussion that is enlivened by the sharp analytical tradition of British academe and made the more agreeable by a capacity for clear and cogent writing.

More than anything else I admire the tone of the Carmodys' approach. They aim to speak of Buddhism as best they can describe it, learning what they can from Buddhism to help them be better Christians. To borrow the now nearly canonical usage of my Notre Dame colleague, John Dunne: the Carmodys want to "pass or cross over" empathetically to Buddhism and come home again to their own tradition enriched. They do not trim their Christian beliefs (at the end of each chapter they assay a Christian reflection on a specific strand of Buddhist teaching), but in this profession of faith they are neither pugnaciously dismissive, apologetically challenging, nor patronizingly conciliatory.

Serene Compassion: A Christian Appreciation of Buddhist Holiness
by Denise Lardner Carmody and John Tully Carmody
Oxford University Press, $22, 136 pp.



The Carmodys see this work as both being a way of interreligious dialogue and a kind of *ressourcement* for their own understanding of Christianity. However much they esteem the tradition of Buddhism, they write from the perspective of orthodox Christology. Having made that stipulation, they are not reluctant to say when Buddhist teaching might conflict with the Christian faith.

Separate chapters discuss the major themes of the several Buddhist traditions: the Buddha himself; Dharma (that is, the "creed"); the Sangha ("community"); and discussions on meditation, morality, and wisdom. Various strands within Buddhism are clearly delineated (Buddhism like Christianity is an umbrella word for a highly complex reality; Zen is not Theravada which is not Tibetan, etc.) as the drive for the basic motif of holiness is laid out. This book should be of special interest to those reading in the area of spirituality.

The Carmodys are quite good in transposing basic Buddhist motifs into more familiar Christian language while warning that certain fundamental orientations do not easily transpose (think of the Resurrection or the prophetic strain in the Bible). At times, I think they even miss some opportunities at transpositions, as, for example, when they attempt to correlate the Buddhist insistence on cessation of desire with monastic *apatheia*. How much better it would have been to think of Cassian's translation of that term as "purity of heart" (taken from the beatitudes) where purity of heart not only means cessation of desire but the single-minded desire for God and God's Kingdom. Purity of heart, as Kierkegaard says, is to desire one thing.

This is a clearly written and quite manageable book. It is irenic, informa-

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Christianity and Judaism



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

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tive, and provocative enough to instruct anyone who is not expert in both traditions. It was sad to see the copyright to *Serene Compassion* only in Denise Carmody's name. John Carmody died in 1995 after a long and painful bout with bone cancer. He wrote right to the end while living with Christian optimism and with nary a whiff of self-pity (*see*, "Meeting My Mother Again," *Commonweal*, March 11, 1994). This work is a tribute to his memory.

Hugo's book is subtitled "A Beginner's Workbook." As a teacher of Franciscans his desire was to introduce his audience to the life and teachings of Saint Francis. This is not as easy as it might seem since, though we possess many early sources for the life of Francis, the status of those sources, the impulses that led to their composition, and the agendas they might be pushing are difficult to disentangle. The problem of these early sources is not unlike those associated with the New Testament, the synoptic problem, and the search for the historical Jesus.

Studying the Life of Saint Francis of Assisi
by William R. Hugo, OFM Cap
Franciscan Press, $17.95, 223 pp.

Hugo's strategy is to devote brief sections of his workbook to the different sources. In roughly chronological order, he takes the events in the life of Francis and has the students read and question the pertinent sources. The workbook must be read in tandem with the *Omnibus of Sources* or some other collection of the early Franciscan *legenda*. At the end of each section Hugo has further suggestions for reading. Each section of the study is a "worksheet" of just a few pages with questions to help readers (he has some very good earlier chapters on how to read hagiographical legends and *florilegia*).

Hugo has put together an extremely fine pedagogical tool. The often arcane scholarship on Francis is set out clearly; the biases of the author are stated up front; and the method of study is straightforward. Working, singly or as a group, through the sources using the work sheets as a guide is the goal. I can only lament that I did not have this useful resource when I taught a course on Franciscan spirituality a few years ago.

The obvious beneficiaries of this workbook would be those in the Franciscan family (whether religious or lay), but any readers who would like to "home school" themselves in Franciscan history and/or spirituality would find it a sure and reliable guide. It also strikes me that what Father Hugo has done for Francis might well be done, *mutatis mutandis*, for any number of crucial religious figures in the tradition or, for that matter, any "difficult" spiritual work.

Whelan, an Australian priest-theologian, has not written anything like a systematic biblical spirituality (that would be a daunting task!). In two appendices we find a clue to what Whelan wants to accomplish: an appendix on the writing of homilies and another on Bible study groups. Whelan intends to provide a

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method of reading the Scriptures for both personal enrichment and ecclesial proclamation or, in his words, to "promote a growing sense of Scripture as revelation in daily living."

Living Strings: An Introduction to Biblical Spirituality
by Michael Whelan
Morehouse Publishers, $11.95, 189 pp.

I am always in search of books like this because of my conviction that even in the academy we are giving students only half a loaf if all they get is technical exegesis (although they surely need that). The rest of the loaf is to appropriate Scripture as revelatory and/or disclosive. Whelan, deeply in debt to the reading praxis of Paul Ricoeur, offers both a way of reading the Scriptures and a series of chapters in which, artfully, he melds a close reading of the text, examples from contemporary literature, and personal reflections. Each chapter ends with practical suggestions of exercises that thicken what the author has written.

Whelan is sensitive to language and, as a consequence, studs his text with excellent observations; "thanks" is close to the word "think," so that being thankful is to think well of someone; on the different shades of the meaning of "good" in the Bible; of how to think of "tragedy" and "comedy" in the biblical narratives; etc. He is particularly fine on the images of God, noting, quite rightly, that the Bible never defines God but merely provides us with "pointers" to grasp some sense of God.

Books like this are an encouragement to a more contemplative and prayerful encounter with the Word of God. In an age of instant seeing and throwaway books, such arts need cultivation. Whelan quotes approvingly a sentiment first expressed by Rainer Maria Rilke: One "does not always remain bent over the pages but leans back and closes his eyes over a text he has been reading again and its meaning spreads through his blood."

Carmel McEnroy had the very good idea of tracking down and interviewing women who were designated as auditors (after the first session) at the Second Vatican Council. Of the twenty-three who attended one or more of the sessions, six were dead; one could not be found (Hedwig Skoda of Czechoslovakia); and the rest were either personally interviewed by McEnroy or contacted by mail. Some were religious or members of secular institutes and the rest lay persons (like the redoubtable Rosemary Goldie, an Australian who later taught at Rome's Lateran University).

Guests in Their Own House: The Women of Vatican II
by Carmel McEnroy
Crossroad, $15.95, 309 pp.

The story of these women orbits around a number of fundamental issues: how they were absent from the opening session and how they came to be invited to subsequent ones; their contributions to the discussions, especially about those issues which would be cen-



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

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

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

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tral to *Gaudium et spes*; the gingerly way (and, in some instances, the hostile way) in which they were treated by the assembled hierarchy; and the limits which were placed on their activities. The distinguished economist Barbara Ward had prepared a paper on world hunger but it was read by James Norris. Alda Miceli, one of the *auditrices*, noted sardonically that women did not speak in the aula until the 1971 synod since the "bishops were not yet mature enough to hear a woman." As late as 1994 women religious were not accorded voting rights at the synod on the religious life, even though their male counterparts, as religious superiors, did enjoy a vote.

McEnroy details the participation of these women with sharp profiles, making this book of great interest to those who wish to contextualize the workings of the council in some historical detail. She pays generous tribute to Bernard Häring, the Redemptorist moral theologian, who argued tirelessly for women to be heard in the council and insisted that there were profound theological issues to be raised about women in the church. Häring, for instance, argued for ordination of women to the diaconate, the need for women theologians in service to the church, and the legitimate role of women in the administrative dicasteries of the church. He did not think that ordination to the priesthood was a "practical" possibility. This position may be nicely contrasted with that of Cardinal Antoniutti who refused to have women on the commission examining the religious life; perhaps at "the fourth Vatican Council," the cardinal opined.

Above all, we have profiles of dedicated, highly intelligent, and articulate women who were the forerunners of those who today fight for equality in the church. There is no small irony in the fact that the author herself lost a tenured position in a seminary for having supported, in a public fashion, the ordination of women to the priesthood.

The twenty-three *auditrices* of Vatican II are now of a certain age. McEnroy's book, even though it is marred by a number of minor *errata*, is a reminder that the Vatican II generation is passing into history. While there is time we need more books of this kind to document the watershed events of the council. Those interested will need to read this generally well-researched and engagingly written work. □

Lawrence S. Cunningham *is chair of the department and teaches theology at the University of Notre Dame.*

CORRESPONDENCE

(Continued from page 4)

Dorothy Day, making a "morale" visit to our Catholic C.O. unit, put our assignment in a spiritual context I have never forgotten and which, I think, has a direct bearing on the elective abortion issue—and, in particular, to the hidden pre-emptive euthanasia implication that I suspect may be present. Drawing the contrast between our alternative service and the military service we had rejected, she noted that, since so many of our charges would never reach the level of "reason," they were incapable of sin and, she went on, we were actually serving future saints!

GORDON ZAHN
Boston, Mass.

Put people to work

With respect to Thomas Massaro's "A Welfare Primer" [June 14]: Whenever I listen to any coffee shop discussion about welfare, the common wisdom says, simply, put these people to work! That isn't necessarily a hostile sentiment. Historically, the church's social teachings have emphasized the value and dignity of human labor and the right of every person to have a gainful, purposeful, and respected role in society.

For me, it follows that the national discussion should not be about term limits for welfare, or about who is deserving and undeserving, but must rather focus on finding ways to place welfare clients in situations where they can make positive contributions. If we count all the costs associated with current entitlement programs, the added cost of providing dignified work opportunities would be very small and would have a potential for long-term savings.

Conventional doubts about "workfare" are that the tasks given to people will be just "make-work" and that mothers will not be able to care for their children. The first of these bespeaks a failure of imagination. Every community needs its parks maintained, graffiti removed, public buildings improved, trails built, records indexed, sorted, filed. Every major U.S. city still benefits from projects carried out by WPA workers in the 1930s. Besides these tangible benefits, such work teaches basic skills and work habits that will equip the recipients for private employment and will assure the community that good and needed work is being done in return for their tax dollars.

Providing safe and adequate day care will enable mothers of small children to complete their education and learn valuable job skills; the children may well benefit from developmental learning opportunities.

Let it begin at an early age. In a time when many young people—especially those from ethnic minorities living in decaying neighborhoods—have few options, the creation of rewarding job opportunities can help lead to responsible and productive citizenship. The potential saving in law enforcement and prison costs could well pay for the programs twice over.

(DEACON) MIKE EVANS
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SUPREME FOLLY

John Hagen, Jr.

The most famous dissent in American jurisprudence is Oliver Wendell Holmes's denunciation of court-ordered Social Darwinism in *Lochner* v. *New York* (1905). *Lochner* struck down a law which forbade a particular class of employers to work their laborers more than sixty hours per week. The U.S. Supreme Court declared this law a violation of the "liberty" guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. In a florid opinion, the justices of the Gilded Age constitutionalized economic *laissez faire*.

Holmes's dissent in *Lochner* is scarcely longer than the Gettysburg Address, and nearly as masterful in stating central truths about American democracy. Holmes insisted that the "liberty" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to trump popular sovereignty in the name of *laissez faire*. In a well-known aphorism, Holmes stated: "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." The Constitution, he added, "is made for people of fundamentally different views....I think that the word 'liberty,' in the Fourteenth Amendment, is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law."

Undeterred by Holmes's rebuke, the Supreme Court went on dictating *laissez-faire* capitalism as constitutional law for more than thirty years. With grandiose declamations on "liberty," the Court struck down minimum wage laws, child labor laws, and much other social welfare legislation.

A constitutional crisis arose when the Court's libertarians persisted in overruling the democratic consensus during the Depression. President Franklin D. Roosevelt proposed a "court-packing plan" that would overtly have politicized the Court by expanding its membership and allowing the rapid addition of New Deal justices. With these threats in the air, the Court at last abandoned its practice of acting as an ideological superlegislature on marketplace issues. It conceded that the Constitution's "liberty" clauses contemplate a regime of *ordered* liberty, and do not dictate *laissez faire*.

This chapter of American legal history is well recalled today. We stand in a constitutional crisis of a similar nature. Once more, libertarian judges are overriding democratic consensus and invoking the "liberty" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as justification. The current outbreak of judicial libertarianism is not economic, but hedonic. Its constant impulse is to maximize individual choice in seeking pleasure and in avoiding pain, regardless of the common good.

Beginning in the 1960s, the Supreme Court dictated a kind of sexual *laissez-faire* to the nation through its anti-censorship rulings. It constitutionalized most erotic imagery and went on to constitutionalize access to contraceptives for unmarried people (a seemingly subtle change in law that has had enormous impact on the status of the family). Then it aggressively constitutionalized abortion, imposing the most permissive abortion regime found anywhere in the Western world.

More recently, lower courts have taken libertarian ideology to even greater lengths. The most flagrant example of this is *Compassion in Dying* v. *State of Washington* (March 1996). In this holding, the Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals declared that constitutional "liberty" includes a right to die in the manner one chooses, and furthermore includes a right to have poison prescribed by a physician.

"Counsel, you're out of order!"

Compassion in Dying, like *Lochner*, is a pure act of judicial legislation. The Court simply dictates libertarian ideology and overrides the democratic consensus (some forty-four states had laws against assisted suicide when this opinion was released). The opinion itself weighs mountains of sociological data, delivers ideological speeches, then briskly dismisses all the reasons for laws against assisted suicide (for example, protection of the handicapped, protection of doctors' integrity). The Ninth Circuit Court negates popular government as nonchalantly as did the Gilded Age justices in *Lochner*.

As *laissez-faire* ideology once again overrides democratic consensus, our culture naturally displays increasingly Social Darwinist features. The tragedy of casual teen-age sex and teen-age pregnancy, and now the emerging horror of euthanasia (with feeble old and handicapped people hounded to "die and get out of the way") are Darwinism at its rawest. *Laissez faire*, after all, is nothing but an elegant French expression for imposing the law of the jungle.

We must speak up. We are embroiled in a constitutional crisis, as in the Depression, and we must once again convince the courts that they stand on untenable ground. We must convince the courts that we are determined to govern ourselves through democratic argument and consensus, not to have libertarianism imposed on us by decree. □

John Hagen, Jr., *is a lawyer who lives and works in Minneapolis.*

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

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The Next Generation

As *Commonweal* enters the second year of its endowment campaign, there is much for which to be grateful. We have asked supporters of the magazine to help sow the seeds of financial stability for the future, and many of you have responded generously. Contributions and pledges to the Edward S. Skillin Endowment Fund now total more than $300,000. Our sincere thanks to all those who have expressed confidence in the future of the magazine through their substantial donations. It has been particularly gratifying to receive contributions from several Catholic colleges and universities. We hope *Commonweal* is a form of "continuing education" for their graduates and thus worthy of such support.

A good start, yes, but there are miles to go before we reap. We ask those who have made contributions to encourage other friends of the magazine to do the same. Your efforts and testimony make a difference. To those who have yet to join in the fun, please consider doing so as we approach the end of the tax year. This "little" magazine survives ONLY because of the devotion of its readers and patrons. Please think of *Commonweal* as you review your will or philanthropic activities. Don't hesitate to contact Endowment Chairman Dennis O'Brien; he's eager to talk to you. Among the many benefits of contributing to the Endowment Campaign, meeting and talking to Dennis O'Brien is the most immediate and the most entertaining. Trust us.

The endowment fund supplements (does not replace) the annual fund-raising efforts to meet current expenses through the Commonweal Associates. These one-time endowment gifts will serve to create an additional, long-term source of revenue needed to match the continuing rise in costs of printing, mailing, promotion, overhead—increases that will inevitably overmatch the ability of the Associates to keep the magazine afloat in the new century. To do this, the endowment campaign focuses on larger gifts and asset transfers through financial instruments such as remainder trusts, charitable annuities, wills, and insurance policies. Such philanthropic gifts can be a financial benefit to the giver, often allowing a tax deduction while interest on the asset is paid.

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